University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2012

The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law
Daniel Abebe

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Abebe, "The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law" (University of Chicago Public Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 390, 2012).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 390

THE GLOBAL DETERMINANTS OF U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW
Daniel Abebe

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
July 2012
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law
Daniel Abebe*
A recurring debate in foreign affairs law focuses on the appropriate level of
congressional and judicial deference to the President. In answering that question, most
scholars focus on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and historical practice for
guidance, or evaluate the expertise and strategic incentives of Congress, the President,
and the courts. For them, the inquiry exclusively centers on domestic, internal constraints
on the President. But this analysis is incomplete. Determination of the appropriate level
of deference has consequences for how the President can pursue American interests
abroad. If the U.S. wants to be successful in achieving its foreign policy goals, it requires
some consideration of the external world in which the President acts. This Article
challenges the conventional wisdom by arguing that the appropriate level of constraint
on the President requires an evaluation of both internal constraints from domestic
sources and external constraints from international politics. It provides a framework to
integrate both sets of constraints, develops a theory of external constraints, and describes
the normative implications of this approach for foreign affairs law. The Article argues
that the failure to account for both internal and external constraints and to recognize
their relationship might yield a deference regime that either does not provide the
President with sufficient freedom to pursue U.S. interests (over-constrained), or leaves
the President free to act without sufficient congressional and judicial oversight (underconstrained). It further explains the conditions under which higher and lower levels of
constraints are preferable and moves us closer to determining the appropriate level of
deference to the President in foreign affairs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most important question in foreign affairs law concerns the
appropriate level of congressional and judicial deference to the President. In other words,
how much, if at all, should Congress and the courts constrain the President? The two
main approaches to the question are legalist and functionalist. The legalist approach turns
to the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and historical practice for guidance, while
the functionalist one hinges on an evaluation of institutional competencies and incentives.
Despite these differences, both legalist and functionalist approaches focus on the role of
Congress and the courts as constraints on the President. So, to determine the appropriate
level of deference to the President, scholars evaluate only domestic, internal factors.
But is that sufficient? Determining the appropriate level of deference to the
President may turn on more than domestic, internal constraints from the Constitution,
congressional statutes and case law. For example, let’s assume the U.S. decides to
promote human rights, democracy, or free trade. Whatever the foreign policy goal, our
ultimate aim is to structure our foreign affairs framework to make it easier for the
President to achieve U.S. interests, while ensuring that the President is not completely
unfettered in ways that raise costs for the U.S. We might begin our inquiry by looking to
internal or domestic factors, but we would surely be unwise to end our analysis there.
Most critically, we also need to know something about the external world in which the
U.S., through the President, is trying to achieve American foreign policy goals in the
teeth of countervailing forces. My aim here is to explore the complex consequences of
this simple observation.
One way to understand the role of external factors in foreign affairs is to frame
the relationship between Congress and the President in principal-agent terms. Imagine
that Congress is the principal and the President is its agent in foreign affairs. Congress
wants the President to use his expertise in foreign affairs to pursue its interests, while still
constraining the President to ensure that he doesn’t deviate from Congress’s interests.
Ideally, Congress wants to optimize the level of constraint to strike a balance: the
President can use his specialized competency to achieve U.S. foreign affairs goals, while
staying loyal to the interests of Congress.
Consider one example of the problem. If the U.S. is the world’s only superpower,
the President can more easily pursue U.S. interests, whatever they might be. Since no
other country can match the U.S., the external constraints on the President are weak. The
U.S. has substantial freedom of action and the President—the agent of Congress—will
have a greater range of opportunities to deviate from the principal’s wishes. However, if
the U.S. is no longer a superpower and is operating in a world with multiple powerful
countries like China, India, and Russia, the President will have greater difficulty pursuing
U.S. interests. Why? In a world with other powerful countries, the U.S. will necessarily
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have to compete with them in pursuing its foreign affairs goals, and the presence of such
countries will constrain the U.S.’s ability to achieve them. These countries represent
international or external constraints on the President or agent. With these external
constraints, the President’s range of opportunities to deviate from the principal’s interests
narrows. What thus becomes clear is that the constraints on the President exist on two
levels, internal and external, and understanding the appropriate level of deference to the
President requires a tool that integrates both those internal and external constraints into a
single analytic framework.
This Article provides that framework and argues that we cannot determine the
appropriate level of constraint on the President solely by resorting to the Constitution’s
text, theories of separation of powers, historical practice, or institutional competencies;
rather, we need to know something about the U.S.’s role in international politics. The
claim is that the level of internal constraints on the President should vary with the level of
external constraints on the U.S. Internal constraints generally refer to the level of
deference to or oversight of the President. External constraints, however, are linked with
the presence of other powerful countries. For example, in a multi-polar world,1 there are
several other powerful countries competing with the U.S. to achieve their foreign affairs
goals. Similarly, in a bipolar world,2 there is one other powerful state challenging the
U.S. for dominance. In each example, the presence of these competing states creates
strong constraints on the U.S., making it more difficult for the President to pursue
American interests.
But, if the U.S. is the single most powerful state or hegemon of a unipolar world,3
the external constraints on the U.S. are weak because there are no other competing
powerful states. The U.S. has greater freedom to pursue its interests. In other words,
variation in the structure of the international politics—multi-polar, bipolar, or unipolar
worlds—results in variation in the strength of external constraints on the U.S.
This framework produces a simple normative logic: as external constraints
strengthen, internal constraints should weaken; as external constraints weaken, internal
constraints should strengthen. When the external constraints on the U.S. are strong, the
President has to pursue American interests in a difficult, competitive international
environment. The President is likely to be disciplined from engaging in risky or suboptimal foreign affairs activity by the external constraints, namely the presence of other
1

Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty
and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1946 (1997) (“U.S. predominance has been undercut by the rise in
economic power of Europe and Asia, by accelerating international interdependence, and by the end of the
Cold War.”).
2
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 170 (1979) (“The United States is the
obsessing danger for the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union for the United States . . . .”).
3
Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2630 (1997) (“[After
the end of the Cold War] [t]he Soviet Union did a remarkable about-face, first embracing international law,
then disintegrating, leaving the United States as ‘the world’s indispensable nation.’”); see also Kenneth W.
Abbot, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9, 13
(2005).
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powerful countries and the realization of the costs they could impose on the U.S. In other
words, the agent is less likely to pursue his interests and deviate from those of the
principal. Moreover, the President’s relative expertise in foreign affairs is more important
in a more complex international environment. The agent needs a greater range of action
to achieve the principal’s goals. Therefore, Congress should lower the level of constraint
on the President.
However, if the U.S. is a global superpower and unconstrained externally, strong
internal constraints on the President are necessary. Since the U.S. is the world’s
superpower, the other countries are not powerful enough to constrain the U.S. In this
example, the agent has more opportunities to pursue his own interests and deviate from
those of the principal. Stronger internal constraints from the principal are now
appropriate.
The failure to consider both internal and external constraints and recognize their
relationship might result in a principal-agent relationship that either does not provide the
President with sufficient freedom to pursue U.S. interests (over-constrained agent), or
leaves the President free to act without sufficient judicial oversight (under-constrained
agent). This framework explains the conditions under which higher and lower levels of
constraints are more preferable and moves us closer to determining the appropriate level
of deference to the President.
Perhaps critically, this approach is agnostic about the normative substance of U.S.
foreign policy. It avoids the problem that often recurs in the foreign affairs literature,
namely that scholars who like one President’s policies support lower levels of constraint
and, when they dislike a subsequent President’s policies, prefer higher levels of
constraint. The approach outlined here simply suggests that if we want the U.S. to be
successful in the achievement of its national interests—whatever they are or should be—
determining the appropriate level of deference requires some consideration of external
constraints.
This approach also avoids the ubiquitous baseline problem for deference; since it
is extremely hard to determine if the status quo is appropriate, too deferential, or too
constraining, normative arguments about where the baseline should be are often driven
by policy preferences. But my approach simply says that, wherever the baseline is or
should be, external factors must be included in the analysis.
The importance of understanding the relationship between external constraints
and the President’s foreign affairs authority has grown dramatically in light of the
changes in international politics. The rise of China,4 the emergence of the developing
4

See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 249 (2004)
(China is currently second in the world in purchasing power parity); id. at 248 (China has the world’s
largest foreign capital reserves); Olena Havrylch & Sandra Poncet, Foreign Direct Investment in China:
Reward or Remedy?, 20 WORLD ECON. 1662, 1662 (2007) (China is a leading destination for foreign direct
investment); see also generally Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2006).

4

world,5 and the U.S.’s potential decline as a superpower suggest that the pursuit of U.S.
interests will be increasingly difficult, making the resolution of deference questions
critical for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals. In other words, the need to try to
optimize foreign affairs law for the challenges of the twenty-first century is clear. And
some of the challenges have been apparent in the buildup to the second Iraq War; 6 the
multiple rounds of unsuccessful World Trade Organization negotiations;7 and the various
failed attempts to reach an effective international agreement on climate change.8 In a
more complex international environment, the level of constraints on the President will
have greater consequences—both positive and negative—for the pursuit of U.S. interests.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses internal constraints and their
efficacy as tool to limit the President. Part III develops the idea of external constraints,
and Part IV provides a metric for measuring them and considers potential alternatives.
Part V links internal and external constraints into a framework to help determine the total
level of constraint on the President and moves closer to establishing the appropriate level
of judicial deference. Part VI examines the implications for foreign affairs law.
II.

UNPACKING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A.

The Structure of the Current Debate

Domestic political outcomes are often the product of international causal
variables. State interactions with international organizations, courts, and administrative
agencies, under certain conditions, shape the internal strategies of domestic actors and
influence policy formation. Scholars have noted the two-level structure of negotiations in
international trade,9 the use of international agreements to bind domestic constituencies,10
5

Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM BUS. L.J. 317,
318 (2006) (“In less than forty years, the BRIC economies collectively will be larger than the G6.”).
6
See generally Robert J. Pauly & Tom Lansford, STRATEGIC PREEMPTION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE SECOND IRAQ WAR (2005); David S. Meyer & Catherine Corrigall-Brown, Coalitions and Political
Context: U.S. Movements Against War in Iraq, 10 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 327, 333 (2005); Felicity
Barringer, Threats and Responses: The U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/20/world/threats-responses-un-some-security-council-want-avoid-takingsides-iraq.html (detailing the varied responses by U.N. members to a war against Iraq).
7
Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asia Re-legitimize Global Governance?, 18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 131,
136 (2011) (“The Doha Round is not progressing because many Western countries no longer believe that
they will benefit from the talks. There is now a real danger that the Doha Round may be the first round to
fail.”).
8
Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate
Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 325 (2010); Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach,
CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1565 (2008); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Weiner, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND
KYOTO (2007).
9
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG.
427, 433, 439 (1998). See generally DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The
International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881 (1978); Peter Gourevitch, International
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and the influence of international actors to explain domestic human rights outcomes.11
The conventional wisdom is that the relationship between states and aggregations of
states in international politics resembles a feedback loop: states influence international
political outcomes, while international politics often influences domestic state outcomes.
The logic of the feedback loop is also useful for understanding the aspects of U.S.
constitutional law that relate to international politics, namely foreign affairs law. Foreign
affairs law allocates decision-making authority between the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches of the federal government. The authority to commit the U.S. to war,
sign treaties, and recognize international law, among other things, are all foreign affairs
questions. For example, when the President recognizes one regime as the legitimate
government of a foreign state—think Taiwan and China—he is exercising both his
constitutional authority and determining U.S. foreign policy. Each has consequences for
international politics. At the same time, those domestic decisions are likely to be
influenced by the international political environment of the moment, or by assumptions
about how that environment might evolve. Understanding foreign affairs outcomes
requires some consideration of international political variables.
Despite this seemingly straightforward insight, the scholarship neither focuses on
international political variables nor provides a framework to understand the relationship
between international politics and foreign affairs outcomes. What scholars have
considered is the role of a vaguely defined, under-theorized conception of international
politics to understand inter-branch relations in foreign affairs and, by implication, to
determine the appropriate level of judicial deference to the President.
For example, the imperial presidency thesis12 suggests that the dominance of the
President in domestic politics is a function of the international political demands on the
U.S. and its development into a superpower in the mid-twentieth century. As the U.S.
committed itself abroad, developed weapons of mass destruction, and increased its
capacity to project power globally, the President assumed powers beyond the
Constitution’s allocation and historical practice, and the courts began to defer to the
executive. The thesis arguably suggests that international politics may have a causal role
in the growth of presidential power.
Others have identified the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the
U.S. as a superpower in the early 1990s as the turning point for thinking about deference

Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896, 8 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 281 (1977).
10
Judith L. Goldstein & Richard. H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial
Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 267 (2008) (“The United States . . .
remains willing, to delegate to WTO dispute settlement the authority to enforce the WTO ‘contract.’”).
11
We particularly see this in the area of human rights. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International
Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 371 (1985) (“The UN Charter, having
been ratified by the United States, is the supreme law of the land.”).
12
See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
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in foreign affairs.13 The proliferation of international organizations and tribunals,14 the
increasing supply and demand for international law,15 and the declining utility of classical
realist thinking,16 lead to the conclusion that lower levels of deference to the President
and a greater role for courts are preferable. The claim is not always explicit but it
suggests that the growth in U.S. power and the rise of international governance require a
change in the balance of decision-making authority between the President, Congress, and
the courts. In other words, international politics, in a general sense, does and should
affect domestic foreign affairs outcomes.
Another group of scholars suggest that the courts should defer to the President on
institutional competency grounds17 and should especially limit judicial review of
presidential actions in times of emergencies or crises.18 The President has substantial
recursive and expertise advantages over Congress and the courts and, in times of
emergencies or crises, those advantages are uniquely important to ensure U.S. national
security. For this group, international politics, in the form of crises or emergencies,
should affect domestic judicial behavior and result in higher levels of deference to the
President.
Though each of these examples suggests that some conception of international
politics has a causal role in explaining foreign affairs outcomes or should be considered
in determining the level of deference to the President, none provides a clear, systematic
framework for defining and incorporating international political factors into the analysis.
Instead, scholars alternatively focus on the demands of U.S. foreign policy; trends in
international governance; changes in the structure of the international system; the rise and
fall of specific international relations theories; or the occasional emergency or crisis. The
international political variables are ad hoc, difficult to interpret, and provide little
guidance for congressional or judicial behavior over time. Though most scholars agree
that international politics is relevant to explain domestic foreign affairs outcomes, the
literature lacks a parsimonious framework to understand what those factors are and when
and how those factors should be considered.
13

Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 723 (1996) (“With the end of the
Cold War, Congress has become increasingly assertive on the foreign policy stage.”).
14
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2003)
(“Not only are there more international courts than ever before, they now have a broader reach.”).
15
Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 510
(2004) (“Domestic groups demand international agreements as a source of international and domestic
law.”).
16
Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 87,
158 (2009) (“[T]he classic realist assumptions that support special deference do not reflect the world as it is
today.”).
17
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien
Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 181 (2004) (“[A]s a matter of institutional competence, the federal
judiciary suffers significant disadvantages in [the development and enforcement of customary international
law as] compared to the Executive Branch.”).
18
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS (2007).
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The lack of a framework is compounded by a narrow focus on the doctrine in
answering deference questions. Despite evidence that international politics influences
domestic legal outcomes, traditional approaches apply competing interpretive methods to
determine the intent of the Framers, read implied powers from enumerated grants, and
weigh functional concerns to determine the proper allocation of authority. But even if we
assume that the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority were appropriate for
the U.S.’s needs in 1787, it is not clear why that allocation would be helpful or even
appropriate for the U.S.’s needs today. The focus is inward, doctrinal, and static, rather
than outward, political, and dynamic over time.
These two problems structure the debate regarding the appropriate level of
constraint on the President. As presidential power expanded in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries,19 the leading view has been that Congress delegates broad authority
to the President and the judiciary often defers to the President. In other words, the
Congress delegates, the President acts, and the judiciary defers. The level of internal
constraints on the President appears relatively low.
Those who view the executive as the more competent branch want courts to
refrain from constraining the President.20 Weak internal constraints on the President
based on its functional advantages21 and historical practice22 are preferred. Those
concerned about the potential of presidential abuse counter that courts should exercise
more oversight of the President and employ stronger constraints.23 They justify the
constraint on the basis of the Constitution’s initial allocation of the bulk of foreign affairs
authority to Congress,24 the benefits of judicial review,25 concerns about a concentration
19

FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S WORLD ROLE
154 (1998) (“Facing weaker structural constraints than those that had dissuaded his predecessors from
pursuing an expansionist foreign policy, McKinley could respond easily to international systemic pressures,
further closing the gap between America’s power and its interests abroad.”).
20
See Eric A. Posner & Cass Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170,
1204-1207 (2007). For arguments that high levels of deference to the executive in times of crisis or
emergencies are appropriate, see generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18; RICHARD A. POSNER,
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
21
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 20; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 17-18, 30-31
(comparing the competencies of the executive and judiciary and concluding that the executive deserves
deference during times of emergency); cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS,
1787-1984 201 (Randall Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing the institutional advantages of the
Executive Branch over Congress).
22
For an example of the role of historical practice, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686
(1981) (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long continued practice, known to and
acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent . . . .”). HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69 (1990) (noting disapprovingly that, “[a]s it has evolved, the National Security
Constitution assigns to the president the predominant role in the process [of making and validating foreignpolicy decisions] . . . .”).
23
See Derek Jinks & Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1230, 1230
(2007) (“We maintain that increased judicial deference to the executive in the foreign relations domain is
inappropriate.”); see also KOH, supra note 22, at 181-84.
24
KOH, supra note 22, at 68 (“Perhaps most striking, the relative balance struck in the Constitution’s
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of power in the executive,26 and a belief that the courts are better placed to make some
foreign affairs decisions.27 How do we reconcile these competing views of deference to
the President and the optimal level of constraints?
B. Principal-Agent: Congress and the President
One way to gain traction on the constraint question is to frame the relationship
between Congress and the President in principal-agent terms. Agency models are perhaps
most associated with economic and political science theories of firm organization.28 The
principal might hire an agent to help increase efficiency or take advantage of the agent’s
specialized skills to achieve the principal’s goals.29 In a perfect world, the agent would
faithfully follow the principal’s instructions, eliminating concerns about agency costs.
But in the real world, the principal realizes that the agent will have his own interests and
those interests might diverge from those of the principal. Thus, the principal must
develop some mechanisms to monitor the agent and provide him with incentives to stay
loyal to the principal’s interests.30 And it must do so with the knowledge that it does not
have full information about the agent’s activities (information asymmetry) or possess the
agent’s expertise.
We can use this insight in the context of the relationship between Congress and
the President. The conventional wisdom in foreign affairs is that the President is the
leading actor in foreign affairs.31 The President has assumed a leading role in formulating
U.S. foreign policy32 and is considered the chief spokesperson for the U.S. in foreign
affairs. While the President’s authority comes from enumerated grants in the
text between the president’s few and Congress’s many enumerated foreign affairs powers hardly matches
our present-day sense of their relative preeminence.”).
25
David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2008).
26
Jinks & Katyal, supra note 23, at 1262 (“We are also induced to reject Posner and Sunstein’s
proposal to depart from existing antideference law because it risks concentrating too much power in the
executive.”).
27
Sloss, supra note 25, at 196 (“[A] President who wants to persuade the world that the United States
takes its international obligations seriously could advance that goal by encouraging a more active role for
the federal judiciary in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.”); see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note
23, at 1263 (“Presidents are nearsighted in a way that other government actors are not, particularly the
judiciary, which tends to be farsighted.”).
28
See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).
29
See, e.g., BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER (1997).
30
See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
31
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1202 (“Courts sometimes say that the executive has the primary
foreign relations power.”); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 174 (2010) (“Executives have always had the leading role in foreign affairs
because of the fast-changing nature of international relations and the importance of secrecy and unity.”);
KOH, supra note 22, at 116. See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 12.
32
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 176
(Aspen 2d ed. 2006) (“In practice, the Executive Branch exercises a virtual monopoly over formal
communications with foreign nations and also plays a lead role in announcing U.S. foreign policy.”).
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Constitution,33 judicial interpretation of those grants,34 historical practice,35 congressional
acquiescence,36 and perceived institutional competencies in foreign affairs,37 much of the
President’s authority comes from Congress’s broad statutory delegations of power. In a
stylized way, the President pursues Congress’s goals under constraints. Congress is
therefore the principal and the President is the agent (more about courts later).
In thinking about this relationship in foreign affairs, imagine three simplified
interactions between Congress and the President. First, Congress and the President’s
interests might align in foreign affairs. In other words, the principal and the agent have
shared interests. For example, Congress and the President both want to protect U.S.
national security and ensure the safety of American citizen. Since the interests of the
principal and agent align on this issue, agency costs concerns diminish. Second, Congress
might be indifferent about the President’s activities. Congress might appropriate money
for foreign aid but might not care if the President gives the money to Kenya or Uganda.
In this instance, agency costs are still low because Congress doesn’t have a strong
preference about the identity of the final recipient of the foreign aid.
But third and most important, Congress and the President’s interests will conflict.
And when Congress and the President conflict, it is often over issues related to the
President’s war making authority. Since the President has a shorter time horizon and a
desire to leave a legacy, the President likely has a greater propensity to take risks to
achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. He doesn’t fully internalize the costs of some of his
foreign affairs decisions. Congress, on the other hand, has a longer time horizon and is
often in the position of trying to constrain the President’s foreign affairs war making
ambitions. This conflict represents a significant subset of the broader array of conflicts
between Congress and the President and certainly represent the most significant and
potential most costly of all foreign affairs decisions – the decision to go to war, engage in
nation-building or participate in lower level hostilities. It is under these conditions—
conflict between Congress and the President over war making issues—that the
framework best applies.
Of course, this is a simplification of the foreign affairs decision-making process.
One might argue the people are the principal and Congress and the President are agents
working on the people’s behalf. Others might argue that the judiciary is an agent of joint
principals, namely Congress and the President, through the advice and consent process.
33

See Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law, 10 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 125 (2009).
34
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The President is the constitutional
representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations.”).
35
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1202 (“[T]he underlying justifications [for deference to the
executive in foreign relations] are often less textual than functional, based on traditional practices and
understandings.”).
36
See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 23, at 1252-53.
37
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1202 (“They say that the executive has expertise and flexibility,
can keep secrets, can efficiently monitor developments, and can act quickly and decisively; the other
branches cannot.”)
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But the goal is not to provide a principal-agent theory of American democracy; rather, the
purpose is to simplify the relationship between Congress and the President to better
understand the role of external constraints and develop a normative claim about the
appropriate level of constraint on the President.
For my purposes, Congress delegates authority to the President, its agent, to act in
foreign affairs and pursue U.S. interests. Congress looks to the President because it has
more expertise in foreign affairs than Congress or the courts. This assumption rests on a
story of comparative statics: the President’s expertise reflects the executive’s tremendous
institutional advantages in foreign affairs—the departments of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security, the Directorate of National Intelligence, and the National Security
Council, among others—the relative dearth of comparable resources in Congress or the
courts, and the President’s practical first-mover status in foreign affairs. The President is
neither the sole actor in foreign affairs nor perfect in its decision-making; the President is
simply the leading actor with greater expertise and resources than the other branches.
Congress delegates to the President, an agent with specific expertise in foreign affairs,
and the President acts in international politics to achieve the principal’s goals.
If Congress is the principal and the President is the agent, what is the role of the
courts? For a perfectly accurate picture of inter-branch relations in foreign affairs, the
model would require some specification of the relationship among the President,
Congress, and the courts. For my purposes, the model assumes that the courts are faithful
agents of Congress. That is, it assumes that courts will interpret statutes in a manner
consistent with congressional wishes.
Of course, this assumption ignores the complexities of inter-branch relations. For
example, the President and Congress nominate and confirm judges with full knowledge
of their preferences and ideologies, making it unlikely that they will always be faithful to
Congress. Moreover, the Supreme Court is a strategic actor with no enforcement capacity
so it is likely to be sensitive to politics in striking down or upholding congressional
statutes or executive action. But, as noted above, to make progress on the overarching
constraint question and develop the normative claim, the model necessarily abstracts
away from the descriptive reality.
Since the Constitution designates Congress and the President as the main actors in
foreign affairs, the model employed here focuses on their principal-agent relationship.
Congress is the principal that can broadly or narrowly delegate authority to the President;
the President is the agent with specialized expertise tasked with implementing the
principal’s goals; and the courts are faithful agents to Congress.
C.

Why Constrain the Executive?

Some might argue that the President should be free from all oversight. Since the
President has the expertise to determine U.S. interests, it is unlikely that foreign affairs
outcomes would be improved by oversight from branches ill-equipped to make foreign
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affairs decisions. If oversight cannot improve outcomes, so the argument goes, the
necessity for constraint diminishes. In this world, the President would be almost
completely unfettered.
Of course, we know that the Constitution does not grant the President complete
freedom to act in foreign affairs. The President works under some level of constraints. If
we think of these constraints as steps along the spectrum away from complete freedom, it
is easier to understand the limits on presidential action. These constraints come in
multiple forms and exist on two levels, domestic and international, or, for my purposes,
internal and external.
Congress might delegate general foreign affairs authority to the President with
respect to international trade and security issues. It might specify certain goals—free
trade or military alliances—for the President to achieve. Like any other principal,
Congress is concerned with monitoring the President and reducing agency costs. Though
the President might have greater expertise, in relative terms, to Congress and the courts, it
does not suggest that the President is perfect; like any other actor, the President makes
mistakes. We know that the executive, similar to other branches of government, is prone
to certain kinds of errors.38
What kinds of errors or agency costs are likely in foreign affairs? At the highest
level of generality, some errors might relate to foreign policy outcomes, others to process,
and still others to policy implementation. Some errors by the President might be only
moderately costly for the U.S., while others might have disastrous consequences. For
example, when Congress delegates authority to the President, we might think that war,39
military occupation,40 nation-building,41 and humanitarian interventions42 are the foreign
affairs decisions that might generate the most costs for the U.S. if the President errs in
planning or executing them. The costs to the principal might be especially high with
respect to this set of foreign policy outcomes. However, foreign affairs decisions about
whether the U.S. should abide by a decision of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”),43 join the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),44 or delegate decision-making
authority to an international organization45 are unlikely to generate the same error costs.
38

See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 31, at 27, 80-88 (observing the executive is prone to suffer
from groupthink but also noting the costs of increasing the number of decisionmakers).
39
An estimated 58,220 soldiers died in the Vietnam War. See ANNE LELAND, AMERICAN WAR AND
MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 11 (2010).
40
Anthony Gregory, What Price War? Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Costs of Conflict, THE INDEPENDENT
INSTITUTE 9 (2011) (estimating cost of funding war operations in Iraq for fiscal years 2001 – 2011 to be
$862.89 billion).
41
Id. (estimating the costs of operations in Afghanistan at $465.82 billion for fiscal years 2001 –
2011).
42
David Axe, Somalia Redux: A More Hands-Off Approach, CATO INSTITUTE 3 (2009) (“Washington
is Somalia’s biggest sponsor. Annual State Department aid to Somalia averages around $100 million. The
United States also helps pay for U.N. operations in Somalia, which cost nearly $500 million annually.”)
43
Ingrid Wuerth, Medellin: The New, New Formalism? 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2009).
44
Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003).
45
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
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Given the potential for costly errors in foreign policy outcomes, Congress’s need
for some constraint to prevent the President from dragging the U.S. into war unilaterally,
pursuing personal glory through conquest abroad, committing the U.S. to entangling
alliances in treaties, or engaging in endless international commitments becomes clearer.
Missteps can create serious consequences for the U.S. and, unsurprisingly, the
Constitution specifically limits the President’s capacity to act in these areas.46
These errors are external or international in nature because they are activities
abroad that might create domestic costs for the U.S. But we can also imagine the
President abusing congressionally delegated authority to expand his decision-making
authority domestically, resulting in internal or domestic errors. Violations of civil
liberties including limitations on freedom of speech, detention without trial, and
warrantless surveillance, among other things, are domestic activities that create costs for
the U.S. And, of course, the Constitution provides protections to limit the capacity of the
national government and the President to engage in some of those activities.47
From the process perspective, we might expect that the executive branch, like any
large, modern bureaucracy, might have internal decision-making structures that might be
subject to error.48 Congress might delegate some authority but flawed mechanisms within
the executive branch to ensure information sharing and open deliberation, for example,
might produce systematic errors in organizational decision-making.49 Poorly designed
incentive structures for key actors might distort the information that the President
eventually utilizes to implement the goals of Congress. Finally, political pressures to
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); David M. Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty
Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Ernest A.
Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003).
46
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power to declare war); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
12-13 (giving Congress the power to appropriate money for the military); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14
(giving Congress power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make treaties with the approval of twothirds of the Senate).
47
U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48
Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863,
883-84 (2010) (“Institutions entail sunk costs, taken-for-granted cognitive frames, and privileged means of
problem solving. Actors inside an organization are subject to pressures to conform to typical practices from
their peers, regulators, professions, and other sources. Feedback from these sources constrains problem
solving.”). Courts often take into consideration the measures taken to avoid errors caused by the decisionmaking structures of administrative agencies. See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality and
relative expertness.”).
49
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 137 (1997) (noting that
groups must simplify agendas to make decisions, which forces them to dismiss ambiguous information as
unmanageable). Langevoort observes that “[w]hen a member brings up some information that suggests that
the group’s decisionmaking has failed to consider something troubling, a threatening form of stress is
introduced into the environment. Without realizing it, each member is inclined to dismiss or ignore danger
signals, leading to less informed decisionmaking that more closely resembles collective rationalization than
prudent choice.” Id. at 138.
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generate certain types of information to justify preferred policy initiatives might deter
accurate information gathering or discussion of alternative viewpoints.50 Though it is
hard to quantify specifically their effects, process errors in the President’s foreign affairs
decision-making generate costs for the U.S.
Congress can safely begin with the assumption that the President is not perfect
and will commit errors in decision-making. If that is correct, the challenge for Congress
becomes how to improve the President’s decision-making and reduce errors, but in such a
manner that the costs of improvement are not greater than the benefits of the President’s
expertise in foreign affairs. Improvements might include substantial judicial or
congressional oversight51 or greater transparency in internal decision-making;52 another
might be more radical, like a substantial shift of decision-making authority away from the
President to Congress.53 But we know that while there are costs from the agent’s errors,
there are also costs from restricting the agent’s capacity to act. If we begin with the
assumption that the President is most competent in foreign affairs, or at least has a
resource advantage and institutional expertise, we would need some confidence that
oversight would improve outcomes, namely that foreign affairs decision-making would
be improved by additional review. If such review has no effect on the agent’s compliance
but constrains the agent from achieving the principal’s goals, the costs of oversight
outweigh the benefits.
D.

Foreign Affairs Law as a Constraint

What are the tools available to constrain the President, reduce agency costs, and
ensure compliance? Let’s begin with internal constraints. ICs broadly defined consist of
all the political and legal limitations that prevent the President from exercising complete
freedom in foreign affairs. Perhaps the most obvious source of ICs is legal and emanates
from the Constitution. The Constitution allocates decision-making authority in foreign
affairs between the three branches of government. Congress, not the President, is
assigned the bulk of the foreign affairs authority.54 The Constitution grants Congress the
majority of the foreign affairs powers in Article I, including the power to declare war;55

50

Id.
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L.J. 31, 35-36 (noting interest groups exert pressure on the political process in part by influencing the
information that reaches legislators).
52
See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 23, at 1279-80. See generally Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
53
Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE
L.J. 140, 260-63 (2009); KOH, supra note 22, at 161-66.
54
See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231, 231 n. 5 (2001) (citing David Gray Adler, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1, 3 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (referring
to the “Framers’ studied decision to vest the bulk of foreign policy powers in Congress”)).
55
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
51
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raise and support an army;56 and define and punish offenses against the law of nations.57
By comparison, the President has a narrower grant of independent authority in Article
II—the Commander-in-Chief Clause58 and the Take Care Clause59—and shares
concurrent authority with Congress regarding the making of treaties and appointment of
ambassadors.60 Though the Constitution is incomplete in assigning all the foreign affairs
powers necessary for a state to function, it sets the basic framework and informs
contemporary debates about the appropriate allocation.
When Congress constrains the President, it does so by drafting more narrow
delegations of power to the President and increasing monitoring of presidential action.
Congress has, at times, attempted to rein in the President through the use of its
appropriations authority,61 the exercise of investigative and subpoena powers,62 and by
passing foreign affairs legislation.63 The War Powers Resolution, for example, attempts
to limit the President’s capacity to commit the U.S. to war without prior congressional
authorization and requires that the President provide regular disclosures to Congress.64
Although there are other tools, these are examples of how Congress attempts to monitor
the President’s activities. Congress has both delegated the President substantial decisionmaking authority and demonstrated the willingness and capacity to constrain the
President under certain conditions.
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Id., art I, § 8, cl. 12.
Id., art I, § 8, cl. 10.
58
Id., art II, § 2, cl. 1.
59
Id., art II, § 3.
60
Id., art II, § 2, cl. 2.
61
In one of Congress’s first appropriations for use of a militia force, the authorization included an
explicit limitation that it would only be in force until the end of the next session. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789,
ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95 § 6, 1 Stat. 95-96. During the Vietnam War, Congress responded to Nixon’s expansion of
the military campaign in Cambodia with a provision denying further funds to introduce ground combat
troops in Cambodia. Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. 91-652, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1942, 1943.
Congress also passed a variety of restrictive laws and amendments during the Iran-Contra controversy to
limit the President’s ability to intervene. See, e.g., Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983) (limiting funding for the Contras from any source to
$24 million).
62
See The 1992-1993 Staff of the Legislative Reference Bureau, An Overview of Congressional
Investigation of the Executive: Procedures, Devices, and Limitations of Congressional Investigative Power,
1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y. 1, 22-24 (1995) (detailing the Senate Select Committee’s investigation of
Watergate); Louis Fisher, Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and Contempt Power, Report for
Congress (April 2, 2003) (surveying past uses of subpoenas and contempt orders and concluding they are
effective ways to gain access to executive branch documents).
63
War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 737 (2008) (“The argument for the virtually irrebutable presumption of supremacy
of congressional war powers draws force from states such as the one the Court recently articulated in
Hamdan that the President ‘may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own
war powers, placed on his powers.’”). For examples of the Court upholding Congress’s ability to control
the type and terms of war see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1
(1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
64
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§1541-48 (1973).
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Courts also play a role in shaping the ICs on the President. When courts decide to
constrain the President, their tool is foreign affairs law. As faithful agents of Congress,
courts can interpret congressional delegations and constitutional requirements narrowly
to limit the President’s ability to act independently or unilaterally. Article III of the
Constitution provides the federal courts with jurisdiction over cases arising out of treaties
or affecting ambassadors, federal statutes touching upon foreign relations law concerns,
and diversity disputes.65 Over time, the courts have interpreted the Constitution to
determine each branch’s authority and developed jurisprudence to answer foreign affairs
questions that the Constitution does not address. Courts have relied on numerous
justifications to determine the level of congressional oversight of the President that the
Constitution requires.66 The courts’ jurisprudence in foreign affairs, to the extent that it
narrows breadth of presidential decision-making, is an example of an IC.67
We might think of these limitations on the President as formal or legal constraints.
They are formal in the sense that they emanate from the Constitution. For example, the
Constitution provides that treaty ratification requires the advice and consent of a twothirds majority of the Senate68 and the designation of ambassadors requires senatorial
consent.69 Similarly, the Constitution assigns the judiciary with the responsibility to
interpret the law, including treaties, and provides the Supreme Court with exclusive
jurisdiction over certain cases touching on foreign affairs.70 These formal grants empower
Congress as the principal and serve as constitutional limits on the President’s capacity to
act independently. The limitations are also legal as they reflect judicial precedent and
congressional legislation in foreign affairs. The Constitution, congressional legislation,
and the courts’ foreign affairs jurisprudence limit the President’s authority.
65

Id., art III, § 2.
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘longcontinued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action]
had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’”) (citing U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-604 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (stating the president’s foreign relations authority is derived from historical practice combined
with Congressional acquiescence); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18 (noting the federal foreign affairs
power of the national government is derived from the laws of nations and national sovereignty); Ex Parte
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148-50 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (discussing the enumerated grants of authority in the
Constitution).
67
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 129 (1814)
(finding that the Executive could not confiscate enemy property located within the United States because
Congress had not authorized it to do so); Little, 6 U.S. at 170 (“A commander of a ship of war of the United
States, in obeying his instructions from the United States, acts at his peril. If those instructions are not
strictly warranted by law he is answerable in damages to any person injured by their execution.”).
68
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
69
Id. (“[A]nd by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . .”).
70
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls, to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, . . . the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”).
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But the President operates under political constraints as well. As a preliminary
matter, it is important to note that the distinction between legal and political constraints is
often blurred. Congressional hearings, for example, may very well be part of the
legitimate exercise of the subpoena power while at the same time a political event
designed to embarrass the President, shape public opinion, and create political costs for
the pursuit of certain policies. Similarly, the Supreme Court might hold that the
President’s actions are unconstitutional when he acts alone but leave open the possibility
that the same action, when acting with congressional approval, may be constitutional.71
Despite the obvious overlap between legal and political constraints, it is possible
to distinguish them. The legal constraints derive from the Constitution, the courts, and
congressional legislation. Political constraints, however, come more directly from the
political process, namely presidential elections, congressional elections for the
President’s party, and public opinion.
Each of those political constraints can limit the President. Perhaps most obvious,
presidents generally want to be re-elected and are loathe to antagonize the electorate with
a significant foreign policy blunder. An unpopular and costly war or the failure to
negotiate a valuable trade treaty might dampen the President’s chances of re-election,
forcing the President to consider carefully his foreign policy. Similarly, the President
might be pressured from members of his own party to refrain from any foreign affairs
adventurism that might hurt their re-election prospects. For example, the party might
pressure and eventually force the President to focus on domestic issues rather than
engaging in a risky humanitarian intervention, even if the President believes that the
intervention would be beneficial for the U.S. Finally, the President may be constrained by
public opinion on foreign affairs questions. Since the election cycle does not always
correspond with current events—and the public does not always focus on foreign policy
when it votes—public opinion could constrain the President as he considers the U.S.’s
foreign policy options.
Congress and the courts have tools to constrain the President and ensure that he
acts consistently with congressional preferences. The question is how to calibrate those
constraints in a manner that maximizes compliance with the principal’s interests but
allows the agent to use his expertise to achieve the principal’s goals. We know that the
principal’s goals concern the achievement of U.S. interests, whatever they are, in
international politics. But the complicating factor is how the external environment, the
world of international politics, influences the appropriate level of constraint the principal
exercises over the agent.
71

See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This is not a
case, then, where the Executive can assert some unilateral authority to fill a void left by congressional
inaction. It is a branch of government, and as part of a long tradition of legislative involvement in matters
of military justice, has considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s
authority.”); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004) (refusing to consider whether explicit
congressional authorization is required because Congress had already provided authorization for the
detention at issue).
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III.

A THEORY OF EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
A.

International Politics and the President

When Congress delegates foreign affairs authority to the President or implicitly
permits him to develop policy, Congress empowers the President to pursue U.S. interests
in international politics. Perhaps the President’s most important responsibility is
maintaining national security. He might negotiate a military alliance, threaten a hostile
state, or send troops to war to preserve U.S. security. He might appeal to the United
Nations (“UN”),72 build coalitions of like-minded allies73 or refer to international law to
achieve the U.S.’s goals.74 For non-security–related goals, Congress also delegates
authority to the President. Subject to congressional oversight, the President represents the
U.S. in trade negotiations through the WTO,75 engages in climate change negotiations
through the UN,76 supports humanitarian relief efforts,77 and provides foreign aid (from
funds appropriated by Congress). In almost every area of foreign policy, the President is
the U.S.’s agent in international politics and is tasked by Congress with achieving the
U.S.’s national interests.
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John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 186 (“[T]he United Nations Security Council gave America and her allies the
authorization it needed to ‘use all necessary means’ to eject Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait.”); Sean
D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 233 (2004) (“[T]he 1993 attacks [on
Iraq] had the informal approval of the Security Council . . . .”).
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Hamada Zahawi, Comment, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi
“Freedom,” 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2296 (2007) (“On March 19, 2003 President George W. Bush
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those words the United States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.”); see
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Jessica L. Powers, Comment, Reduce, Reuse, Resort to Litigation: Global Warming Lawsuits and
What They Mean for Texas, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 123, 141 (2007) (“In 2002, the Bush Administration
reaffirmed its dedication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and
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strategic value in fighting international poverty by stating that the international community must ‘fight
against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.’”).
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We also know the U.S. is not all-powerful and unfettered when it acts abroad.
ECs impose costs for the U.S. in achieving its foreign policy goals and limit what the
President can do abroad. Most important, once Congress has delegated authority to the
President, ECs limit on his foreign affairs decision-making and the resultant foreign
policy. For illustrative purposes, we can imagine two simplified versions of foreign
policy implementation.
In the first version, Congress delegates foreign affairs authority to the President,
and he and his advisors develop a list of all the foreign policy goals the U.S. would like to
achieve. Let’s assume that one of the goals is preventing genocide through humanitarian
intervention. After setting this goal, evidence of an apparent genocide in Sudan comes to
the President’s attention. In an ideal world with an all powerful U.S., the President would
send U.S. troops to intervene and protect the targets of the genocide, consistent with his
foreign policy of humanitarian intervention. But in the real world with ECs, the President
might consider that China has strong political and economic interests in Sudan and the
current regime;78 he might consider the effects in the Arab world from an intervention
into a predominantly Muslim country; and he might have to consider the interests of
European allies or other countries that might rely on Sudanese oil. After considering
these ECs, the President might decide to modify his foreign policy goal, even if that goal
happened to be good for the U.S. In this example, the ECs have constrained the U.S. and
the President’s ability to act, forcing the U.S. to come up with a second best solution, like
sanctions or political pressure, to try to achieve the stated goal of stopping genocide.
In the second version, the President and his advisors develop a series of foreign
policy goals in light of the ECs from international politics. Using the example above, the
President and his advisors might consider the interests of the Chinese, the Arab states,
and European allies before they formulate the U.S.’s foreign policy goals. Given these
ECs, the U.S. might still set a goal of preventing genocide as a key part of foreign policy,
but it might decide that sanctions, not humanitarian intervention, are the only feasible
way to achieve the goal. The U.S., through the President, has built the ECs into its
foreign policy development. What becomes clear here is that whichever simplified model
of foreign policy development you assume, the ECs either cause the U.S. to modify its
first-order foreign policy goals or internalize the ECs as it develops foreign policy. In
both examples, Congress might carefully delegate authority to constrain the President but
will discover that ECs already limit the President’s ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy
goals.
In some ways the discussion here is too simple. Courts, legislatures, and scholars
all recognize that the U.S. operates in international politics under some level of ECs. It is
obvious that the U.S., acting through the President, cannot do whatever it wants.
However powerful the U.S. is or might have been, it does not have complete freedom of
78

See Andrew Higgins, Oil Interests Push China Into Sudanese Mire, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2011, at
A01 (detailing China’s interests in Sudan).
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action in foreign affairs. The gap in the literature is the failure to appreciate that a
systematic understanding of the ECs might shed light on the appropriate level of ICs on
the President.
B.

Which External Constraints?

How can we determine which EC corresponds to a specific foreign policy
initiative? And if we can figure that out, how can we measure the strength of ECs on the
President? While the analysis in the Sudan example above is simplified, it might be
helpful at getting traction on these questions. We might imagine that there are a number
of potential ECs that were excluded from the example. The United Nations Security
Council (“UNSC”) might want to take the issue of genocide and humanitarian
intervention under consideration;79 the International Criminal Court might want to bring
genocide charges against the President of Sudan;80 some states might prefer negotiations
in lieu of sanctions;81 non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch or
Amnesty International might endorse direct intervention and regime change;82 the
African Union might want an internal, African solution;83 and the list goes on and on.
The number of potentially relevant ECs is enormous.
It is difficult to weigh all the possible ECs on the President. Is the view of the
UNSC a stronger constraint than the preferences of our European allies or the Arab
states? How sensitive should the U.S. be to the interests of the African Union? Moreover,
the relevant EC will likely change from issue to issue, and might even be linked to other
ECs; for example, antagonizing China over Sudan might lead to Chinese intransigence
79
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with respect to WTO and climate change negotiations.84 These difficulties are
exacerbated by the dynamic nature of international politics: regimes change, exogenous
shocks trigger rapid modifications in policy, and states vary in power over time. The
Arab Spring is an instructive example. In light of these factors, weighing the relevant
strengths of ECs combined with the potential for issue-linkages makes calculating the
ECs on the President exceedingly complicated.
Given these complications, measuring the ECs on the President might appear
futile. There are too many variables, both observable and unobservable, that influence the
relative strength of ECs on the President at any given time. First, the sheer number of
potential variables from international politics might make any meaningful measurement
impossible. At any given time, the President lacks the resources to analyze all of the
potentially relevant data that might inform his decision-making and, even if he could, it is
unlikely that much of the data would be readily available anyway. Second, given the
heterogeneity of states and interests, it would be exceedingly difficult to determine ex
ante which variables matter for which issue, and even harder to know what the
consequences of one foreign affairs decision might be on the achievement of another.
Third, as administrations change and interests evolve, it is difficult to measure the
intention of other states or their likely responses to U.S. actions. It is clear that the
President operates with some constraints in international politics, but determining the
strength of ECs on the President is difficult.
But despite these measurement problems, when the President is exercising
delegated authority he still has to make some determination about the strength of ECs
when he attempts to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals; the President cannot sit idly by
simply because international politics is too complicated or messy. The President cannot
throw up his hands and proceed to act in international politics without considering the
ECs or the costs that opposing states and international organizations could impose on the
U.S. However difficult it may be, the President must calibrate U.S. foreign policy in light
of the ECs in international politics; the importance of the particular foreign policy goal;
the interests of other states, international organizations, and allies; and the strength of the
U.S. Though the final determination might be crude and imprecise, the President must
use some metric or tool to analyze the ECs and determine which are most relevant in light
of the U.S.’s foreign policy goals.
One way to do this is to develop a hierarchy of ECs on an issue-by-issue basis.
For example, if the President is trying to push for increased trade liberalization through
the WTO, he might find that the U.S. is constrained by the interests of the EU and China.
They might support trade liberalization as well but on terms that the U.S. finds
objectionable. Given the size of their respective economies, this state and supranational
entity likely present the strongest ECs on the President. Of course, there are other
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important states—India, Brazil, Korea, Japan, and Canada—that might object to the
U.S.’s agenda and could create additional ECs. But these states might be lower in the
hierarchy of ECs on the U.S. because their capacity to limit the U.S. is weaker. The point
here is that the President might view the EU and China as posing the biggest obstacles to
achieving U.S. interests and thus focus on mollifying their concerns because they
represent the strongest and most salient ECs on the U.S.
A similar logic might apply to negotiations to address greenhouse gas emissions
and climate change.85 The U.S. might want a cap on global greenhouse gas emissions
based on aggregate emissions,86 where China is the leading emitter,87 rather than percapita emissions, where the U.S. is among the worst emitters.88 For the same reasons,
China, India, and the developing world might be opposed to caps on aggregate emissions
because they are still developing their economies;89 their per-capita emissions are
smaller. Given the issue, a different set of ECs might be relevant and the U.S. will have
to calibrate its policy goals in light of them.
Another option is to create a hierarchy of ECs in broader issue areas like security
or human rights. For security related issues, perhaps the U.S. is most concerned with
China and some states in the Middle East. They might pose strong ECs on our policy
goals in East Asia and the Middle East respectively. For example, as China grows in
economic and military strength,90 our views about aiding Taiwan from a potential
Chinese invasion might evolve. This provides a strong EC on the U.S.
Similarly, the U.S. has to deal with ECs in the Middle East. In a perfect world, the
U.S. might want to see democracies and respect for the rule of law throughout the region.
In the world we live in, the U.S. might have the same normative goals but is constrained
by the fact that democracy and elections could possibly produce anti-US regimes. This
concern might explain the Obama Administration’s initial hesitancy in supporting the so85
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called “Arab Spring,”91 especially when the protests challenged allies in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Bahrain.92 Whatever one thinks about the merits of U.S. foreign policy, the
U.S. has to navigate the ECs of the region.
This discussion leads to a few conclusions about the role of ECs on the U.S. and,
by extension, on the President. First, ECs on the U.S. exist. The President does not have
complete freedom of action in pursuing U.S. interests and must internalize the costs of
the ECs as he formulates policy. At times, this will force the U.S. to pursue polices that
deviate from its first-order preferences. Second, ECs are hard to calculate. The pool of
potential ECs is large, the relevant ECs for a specific foreign policy initiative are hard to
determine, and the strength of ECs are likely to vary over time. Third, when the U.S. acts
in international politics, the President still has to internalize the costs of ECs when he
develops and executes foreign policy. Though the process is inexact and more of an art
than a science, the President cannot ignore the ECs from international politics. Finally,
the only way to make progress on understanding the total level of constraint on the
President requires some consideration of the combined effect of ICs and ECs. This
requires a clear parsimonious framework to aggregate, analyze, and measure the level of
ECs in international politics.
IV.

AN EVALUATIVE METRIC FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

The normative claim in this Article is that the strength of ICs on the President
should vary inversely with the strength of ECs on the U.S. Understanding the strength of
ECs and the total level of constraint on the President will assist in getting closer to
optimizing the level of ICs on the President. But we need a framework that sufficiently
captures the strength of ECs in a parsimonious way, while not including so many
variables to make it infeasible or unworkable for the President, courts, or legislatures to
apply.
A.

Polarity as a Proxy for External Constraints

The answer to this problem is to develop a framework that uses the concept of
polarity in the international system as a proxy for ECs. Polarity is a concept generally
associated with realism93 but is also present in the broader international relations
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literature.94 Polarity is a term that captures the distribution of power in international
politics and the nature of the international system at a specific moment. Polarity is
perhaps best explained by illustration. Let’s assume that the there are five powerful
countries in the world, the U.S. and States A, B, C, and D. They are all comparable in
power and significantly more powerful than any other state in the world. Assume further
that power is measured in material terms by measuring economic and military strength.
Since these states have more power than the others and a disproportionate capacity to
influence international politics, they are the “great powers”95 of the world. One way to
describe a world with five great powers is to consider each one as a “pole” in the
international system; in other words, one can evaluate the world by counting poles or
using the concept of polarity.
A world with five great powers is a multipolar world because there are five or
multiple “poles” of power. Similarly, a world with two great powers, for example the
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a bipolar world. Finally, a world with
only one great power is a unipolar world. The concept of polarity is simply a
methodological tool to help organize information to understand state behavior and
analyze international politics.
Before explaining the usefulness of polarity as a proxy for ECs, it is necessary to
explain why polarity is a useful tool generally to analyze international politics. First,
determining the polarity of the international system—multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar
worlds—is not overly complicated. One can roughly analyze the economic and military
strength of states to determine which are most powerful. The size of a state’s military, the
distribution of conventional and nuclear weapons, the level of technological
advancement, the frequency of military engagement, and the level of military spending,
among other factors, are generally ascertainable. Similarly, the size of a state’s economy,
the per-capita gross domestic product (“GDP”) or purchasing power parity (“PPP”), the
level of economic development, the current account deficit, and other factors are also
empirically verifiable.96 While these factors do not produce a perfect measure of material
power—no one claims that they do—polarity allows a rough distinction between stronger
and weaker states, and helps specify the outliers—the great powers. One can count the

94

See, e.g., Edward D. Mansfield, Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power, 37 INT’L
STUD. Q. 105 (1993) (arguing that polarity is more useful when combined with an analysis of concentration
of power); Joanne Gowa, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 4, 1245-1256
(1989).
95
Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2007) (“Few States have the material
power . . . . Those states that do—the great powers—are rational, self-interested actors that also enforce
international law according to their self-interests.”).
96
In 2011, China’s GDP was estimated at $11.3 trillion, with a GDP per-capita of $8,400. The same
year, China’s budget deficit was 1.8 percent of GDP. In comparison, the United State’s GDP was estimated
at $15.04 trillion, with a GDP per-capita of $48,100. The United States’ budget deficit was 8.9 percent of
GDP.
THE
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK
(2011),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

24

number of great powers and determine the polarity in international politics. Polarity
provides a general metric to separate out the states that are likely to be most influential.
Second, considering polarity permits a focus on the primary actors in international
politics, namely the great powers. In a perfect world, the President might have the
resource capacity to consider the interests of every state in the world before pursuing a
policy. He might also determine the likely behavior of international organizations, nonstate actors, and NGOs, and gauge world public opinion. Realistically, however, the
President does not have the capacity to engage in such an analysis. The world is too
dynamic and complex. Polarity provides a helpful tool to cut through the minutiae of
international politics and extract the salient information. The states with the resources,
interests, and capacity to shape international politics are generally those with the most
material power. For better or worse, those great powers set the terms of debate in
international politics.
For example, we can easily name the most influential states in international
politics in a number of issue areas, including those that are prominent in international
organizations; that contribute most to the development of international law; that are most
willing to use military force; that push for trade liberalization; and that promote human
rights. Both the casual observer of international politics and the scholar of international
relations would probably suggest that the U.S., China, Great Britain, India, and Russia
are among the dominant states in the world and the EU (led by Germany and France) is a
powerful supranational entity. While not all of these states are great powers, they
represent 61 percent of world GDP,97 66 percent of world military spending,98 and 50
percent of world population.99 They are not equally powerful—and their influence varies
depending on the issue area—but each state or supranational entity listed has the capacity
to shape the direction of international politics. This capacity also suggests that any of
these states can, if necessary, impose costs on a competing state and constrain that state’s
foreign policy decision-making.
Third, the emphasis on great powers makes the determination of state interests
and the measure of ECs more manageable. The President can focus on determining the
interests of the great powers and evaluating the ECs that they can impose, rather than
painstakingly examining the potential ECs from every state, international organization,
and other actor in international politics. In other words, viewing the world through
polarity provides a tool to bring order to complexity and generate useful information for
the President.
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Finally and perhaps most important, polarity can be viewed as a useful proxy for
ECs. Let me explain by illustration. Drawing from the earlier example, assume a world
with five great powers—States A, B, C, and D, and the U.S. We might assume that each
of these great powers has a set of fixed interests, shared interests, and unique interests.
Consider fixed interests. We can assume that each great power—and every state
in the world—would like to maintain perfect territorial, political, and economic
sovereignty and ensure its national security. Regardless of regime type, each state would
want to act within its territory with complete freedom. Such freedom would allow a state
to adopt polices that are welfare enhancing, even if such policies produce externalities for
other states. This might not be possible in a globalized world, where there are mutual
benefits from comprising sovereignty on some issues, but it would be a first-order
preference.
The great powers might have overlapping or shared interests. For example, the
U.S. and State A might want to promote respect for international human rights,
democracy, and rule of law; States B and C might endorse a strong policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states; and the U.S. and State D might want free
trade and a global climate change agreement. Alternatively, some of the great powers
might work together to limit the ability of other great powers to achieve their goals. Since
States B and C believe in a policy of non-intervention, they might work together to stunt
the U.S. and State A’s policy goal of using international law to regulate human rights
practices. Or States A, B, and C might work together to oppose the U.S. and State D in
their pursuit of a climate change agreement. In a globalized world, we can imagine
different coalitions of great powers pursuing their shared interests across different issue
areas.
The great powers will also have unique interests, or interests idiosyncratic to each
of them. In a heterogeneous world, we would not expect that all states, or even just the
great powers, to possess exactly the same interests. Some interests might be unique and
benign. For example, State A might want to have the lowest per-capita carbon emissions
in the world or provide foreign aid to all needy states. Some interests may be unique and
threatening: State B might want to control the world’s natural gas resources or recover
historically salient “lost” land that is now located within the territory of another sovereign
state. The exact source of national interests in the creation of foreign policy is difficult to
specify, but we can imagine that they are influenced by heterogeneity among great
powers in their domestic politics, geostrategic locations, threat environments, histories,
cultures, nationalist sentiments, normative aspirations, and resource endowments, among
other factors.
In light of this heterogeneity, it is uncontroversial to suggest that the
circumstances of the U.S.’s founding might influence the normative aspirations that the
U.S. pursues in international politics—the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and
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human rights.100 Similarly, China’s strong support of the principle of non-intervention in
the affairs of sovereign states is reflective of the history, domestic politics, and interests
of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).101 The European experience in World War I
and II might make the EU more reticent about the use of force than other states. India’s
historical tension with China and Pakistan might shape its national interests,102 just as the
complicated threat environment that Israel faces also influences its foreign policy goals.
The takeaway is that heterogeneity in state formation, politics, and culture results in
states possessing unique and potentially conflicting interests.
B.

Measuring External Constraints

If this is correct, it is easy to conclude that we live in a heterogeneous world in
which states have some set of fixed, shared, and unique interests, and the pursuit of those
interests will produce varying levels of conflict in international politics. This logic also
applies to great powers. We should expect to see friction as great powers interact in
pursuit of their national interests. The U.S. may not be able to realize a particular goal
because it recognizes that States A and B are opposed. The U.S. might engage in a rough
cost/benefit analysis and conclude that the benefits of a goal are outweighed by the costs
that States A and B could impose on the U.S. Or it might conclude that the achievement
of certain goals necessitates collaboration and difficult compromises with other great
powers that the U.S. would not otherwise make. For example, the U.S. might have
wanted to protect Georgia’s fledgling democracy in its 2008 conflict with Russia,103 but it
realized that the economic, political, and military costs of attempting to do so outweighed
the benefit from guaranteeing Georgia’s territorial integrity or political sovereignty.104
The inevitable frictions of international politics create costs for every state and great
power as they pursue their foreign policy goals. Those costs are ECs on a state’s foreign
affairs decision-making; for the U.S., they serve as ECs on the chief actor in foreign
affairs, the President.
If the frictions of great power politics create ECs, how can we measure them? We
can start by determining the polarity of the international system. For purposes of this
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discussion—and the framework outlined later—I will focus on multipolar and unipolar
environments.
Let’s start with a multipolar world. By definition, in a multipolar world there are
more than two great powers of comparable economic and military strength. Just like the
earlier example, let’s assume that there are five great powers including the U.S. It is not
necessary that each great power be exactly equal in material power; rather they should be
comparable to one another and each should be significantly more powerful than the other
states in the world.
In this multipolar world, the five great powers will each have a set of fixed,
shared, and unique interests. Since we know that the great powers will not always have
identical interests, at times we would expect friction between them to the extent their
interests are directly conflicting or non-complementary. Of course, if the great powers do
not have conflicting interests or are able to reach mutually beneficial arrangements in
pursuit of their foreign policy goals, we would expect the level of friction to be lower.
However, in a heterogeneous world, we would not expect a frictionless international
political environment—even allies will have occasion to disagree on some fundamental
foreign policy goal. Recent examples might include France and other allies’ strong
opposition to the second Iraq War105 or the U.S.’s unwillingness to commit fully to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) mission in Libya.106 The frictions, or the
costs of certain policy initiatives, are ECs.
A multipolar world represents the condition under which we would expect
frictions to be highest and, therefore, the ECs to be strongest. With five great powers, for
the U.S. there are at least twenty-four possible two-state dyads per area of interest, and
even if we define such areas at the highest level of abstraction (focusing only on trade,
security, and the environment) the number jumps to seventy-two. If we define the
national interest in each issue area more narrowly—a more realistic approach—the
possible permutations increase dramatically. And as they increase, the possibility of
friction and disagreement also increases and the level of ECs on any given great power
grows stronger.
In a perfect world, the U.S. would want complete freedom from ECs. The U.S.
would pursue its preferred foreign policy goals irrespective of the interests of other states.
Those goals, while beneficial for the U.S., might impose costs on other countries. The
U.S. might want Taiwan to declare its independence regardless of China’s preferences
and, in a perfect world, the U.S. would be free to pursue that goal. But in a multipolar
world, the U.S. has to navigate the complexities of international politics with four other
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great powers that are also pursuing their respective national interests. Since a multipolar
world includes multiple great powers and creates more opportunities for friction, it is the
structure that generates the strongest ECs on the U.S. What is helpful here is that the
logic of polarity also permits an understanding of the strength of ECs as the structure of
the international system changes.
By now, it is clear that the unipolar world, presents the weakest ECs on the
unipolar state or the hegemon of international politics. Let’s assume that the U.S. is the
hegemon. It far surpasses the material power of the other dominant states in the world.
This might be an accurate description of U.S. power in the late twentieth century after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.107 During that period, Great Britain, Russia, or Germany
might have been considered among the most powerful and influential states in
international politics but both were significantly weaker than the U.S. in material terms.
As the hegemon of a unipolar world, the U.S. would enjoy the greatest flexibility in
setting and achieving its foreign policy goals. While it would not have complete freedom
of action—the U.S. is not all-powerful—it would be free from the frictions and ECs that
multipolar and bipolar worlds create. The U.S. still would have to consider the interests
of other states, but the costs they could impose would be lower because of the U.S.’s
strength and the other states’ relative weakness.
C.

Alternatives to Polarity

In this way, polarity serves as an effective proxy for the ECs in international
politics. Polarity provides a straightforward metric (material power) to determine which
states are most influential in the world; parses through the huge number of potentially
relevant data to select the most salient to measure ECs; captures variation in ECs over
time; and offers a parsimonious framework to understand the operation of ECs. If
material power has a causal effect on how states behave—and no one denies that it has
some effect—then it will be helpful in measuring ECs.
But despite these strengths, polarity also has several weaknesses. The key,
however, is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of polarity as a proxy for ECs in
light of the alternative options. In other words, if one agrees that understanding the
strength of ECs is vital to calibrate the level of ICs on the President—the central claim of
the Article—it is important to evaluate polarity as a metric relative to the next best
option, not in absolute terms. When Congress delegates to the President, it is critical that
the President understand the level of ECs on the U.S. before formulating and pursuing
U.S. foreign policy goals. Even if polarity is not a first-order solution, it is the best metric
available for a critical issue of international politics.
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1.

Material Power v. Soft Power

What are the problems with polarity? And what are the potential alternatives? One
clear weakness of polarity is also one of its strengths, namely, its parsimony. The use of
polarity requires a measurement of the material power of the dominant states in the
world, a designation of those states as great powers or poles in international politics, and
a determination of the structure of the international system as roughly multipolar or
unipolar. From there, the level of ECs correlates with the structure of international
politics and the frictions that each structure produces for the great powers. This simplicity
makes polarity a useful concept to apply but leaves out numerous factors that might also
be relevant in measuring the level of ECs in the world.
First, polarity assumes that material power is the proper metric to determine the
capacity of a state to influence international politics. But we know that material power is
not the only way to influence other great powers. One example is the concept of soft
power,108 the idea that the power of a state’s regime type, way of life, culture, intentions,
and values might also be an effective tool to influence other states in international
politics.109 Applied to the U.S., it describes the U.S.’s capacity to influence other states
by its democratic values, rule of law, civil liberties, and benign intentions, and by its
popular culture, measured through its books, movies, and language.110 If the instruments
of soft power have a causal effect on state behavior, it suggests that polarity’s focus on
material power is misplaced or at least incomplete.
But soft power presents a greater set of problems than those associated with
material power. Second, the definition of soft power is unclear. Using the U.S. as an
example, proponents of soft power generally focus on the best attributes of American
culture—rule of law, civil liberties, and democracy—as the instruments of power that
influence other states.111 But it is not clear why soft power, as an analytical matter, should
not include the less attractive features of American culture like a high incarceration rate,
gun violence, income and racial inequality, and other factors. To the extent that the U.S.
represents some combination of all of these features, it is not clear that we only project
the positive image and that the positive image is the only one that other states receive.
Though the example here focuses on the U.S., the underlying logic would apply to the
soft power efforts of China, the EU, or India, among others.
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Third, soft power as concept is plagued by the problem of acoustic dissonance.
The image that a state believes it projects is not necessarily what others receive, and a
state might send multiple contradictory messages at the same time. For example, the
U.S.’s soft power efforts to project an image of benign intentions and respect for Islam
are likely completely sublimated by our use of material power, namely by the U.S.’s
occupation of Iraq, support of dictatorships in the Arab world,112 and treatment of
Muslim detainees at Guantanamo Bay113 and Abu Ghraib.114 The U.S.’s benign soft
power message might be contradicted or completely crowded out by its exercise of
material power.
Polarity’s emphasis on material power is not a perfect measure, but relative to soft
power it is generalizable, clearly defined, and empirically verifiable. The problems
related to definitional clarity and acoustic dissonance suggests that the concept of soft
power is too underdeveloped to determine which states are most influential in
international politics. Soft power may very well supplement a focus on material features
as measures of power, but it is not an effective replacement of it.
2.

The Role of Regime Type

Another problem is that polarity does not capture differences in regime type.
Regime type classifies the type of governance system in a state, generally focusing on
distinctions between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Polarity emphasizes
material power and the structure of the international system and ignores regime type.
Why is this problematic? If regime type has a causal effect on state behavior, then it
might serve as a better proxy for ECs. For example, democratic peace theory115 suggests
that regime type is correlated with a propensity to go to war. Democracies are less likely
112
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to go to war with other democracies than they are with autocratic regimes.116 If this is
correct, it would suggest that consideration of regime type might affect the measurement
of ECs on a state.
While this critique is important, it does not by itself suggest that a reliance on
polarity is misplaced. First, although studies seem to show that war is unlikely among
democracies, it is important to note that defining democracy is not as easy as it might
appear.117 For example, the conflict between Russia and Georgia was ostensibly between
two democracies,118 and skirmishes between India and Pakistan are also hard to define.
These might be outliers but they are suggestive that democracy is not a binary
determination; democracies likely fall across a spectrum.
Second, democratic peace theory only explains propensity to go to war; it does
not apply to myriad other issues that arise between states. It does not suggest that
democracies will agree when to go to war with autocracies, will easily reach agreements
with respect to international trade issues and climate change, or will share the same views
on the content of international law. Third and most important, focusing on regime type
does not provide an effective metric of the level of ECs on the U.S. It suggests that
disputes between democracies are unlikely to result in war but it does not show that great
power competition over other security and non-security issues will necessarily be easier,
or that the frictions that create ECs would disappear. While this is helpful, heterogeneous
national interests will still produce ECs even among democratic great powers.
Democratic peace theory might supplement the use of polarity for thinking about ECs
with respect to wars among democracies, but it does not displace it as a measure of ECs
in international politics.
3.

International Organizations

Polarity also ignores the role of international organizations in measuring the ECs
on the U.S. The number of international organizations has increased dramatically during
the twentieth century as the demand for international governance has grown.119 States
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continuously resort to international organizations and delegate decision-making authority
to them in many instances. This, by itself, may very well be evidence that international
organizations have a causal effect on state behavior. The bigger question, however, is the
extent to which they might constrain the great powers.
One theory of international organizations is that they reflect the interests of the
states that create them.120 When the U.S., China, the EU, or any other state has the power
to build an international organization, it is likely to design it in light of its national
interest. In this view, international organizations do not have an independent corporate
personality; they are tools that constitute their membership.121 Since there is no global
policeman in world politics—no powerful entity above the states that can enforce
international law—the great powers that create international organizations dominate
them. For example, the U.S. and other states founded the UN for the purpose of
preserving peace and security,122 and created the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”) to support development and promote stability in exchange rates. Of course,
the U.S. ensured that the UN would also have a UNSC where the U.S. can exercise its
interests through a veto power,123 devised the voting arrangements to guarantee influence
at the World Bank and the IMF,124 and established a norm that the leaders of both
organizations would be either European or American.125
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With respect to security issues, the UN can only act with the military, intelligence,
and power projection resources of its member states; the UN relies on the collective will
of its member states to constrain another acting in violation of the UN Charter. This
structure makes it particularly susceptible to manipulation by the great powers. The U.S.,
France, Great Britain, China, and Russia, through their veto power on the UNSC, can
block or threaten to block resolutions authorizing actions or condemning the behavior of
other members of the UN.126
But their power does not stop with the veto: great powers, by definition, are
stronger than the other states and also have the capacity to circumvent the UN when
necessary. For example, when President Clinton could not get a UNSC resolution for the
use of force to protect Kosovar Albanians from the then-Yugoslav government, the U.S.
simply ignored the UNSC and the threat of a Russian veto and organized a “coalition of
the willing”—otherwise known as NATO—and pursued its desired policy.127 Similarly,
President George W. Bush ignored the UNSC and the threat of a French veto and
organized a “coalition of the willing”128 to overthrow Saddam Hussein and occupy Iraq in
the Second Gulf War. In each instance, it is not the UN qua UN that tried and failed to
constrain the U.S.; rather it was Russia and France as powerful states with competing
interests. These examples simply demonstrate that while the UN and the UNSC do
impose some costs on the great powers, they are not always effective ECs. A focus on the
great powers captures their interests, whether or not they are pursued through the UN.
All of this does not suggest that the UN or other international organizations have
little value. The UN has had significant successes in areas related to peacekeeping, postconflict nation-building, and health-related endeavors.129 Many international
organizations in the non-security context have been successful. The WTO, for example,
has been cited as an example of powerful states sublimating their interests to further trade
liberalization. But the formation and structure of international organizations and their
dependence on the most powerful states for funding,130 military capacity131 and agenda126
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setting suggest that international organizations are unlikely to be a regular, continuous,
and effective constraint on great powers. Particularly in the security context, polarity
helps narrow the focus to powerful states, the chief actors of international politics both
inside and outside of international organizations.
4.

International Law and Norms

A similar critique applies to international law, shared norms, and world public
opinion. International law is the product of treaties and customary international law
(“CIL”).132 Treaties are agreements between states, and CIL reflects the custom and
practice of states that has become a norm and is followed by states out of legal and moral
obligation.133 It is widely noted that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time.”134 But this quote
does not tell us much without knowing the content of international law.
Treaties or bilateral coordination can ameliorate some constraints on states. Let’s
imagine a bilateral treaty between two great powers, the U.S. and State A. They will enter
into a treaty when they find that they can reach mutually beneficially arrangements on a
particular issue. If either state were all-powerful, it would not want to compromise
because it wants to achieve its perfect first-order goals. But in the real world the U.S. and
State A are constrained and have to reach goals through compromise and
accommodation. While treaties serve as a solution to a problem—for example, access to
markets and the reduction of protectionism—the treaty’s content is unlikely to reflect the
first-order preferences of either the U.S. or State A. The key is to realize that the treaty
itself is not imposing an EC on the states independent of their self-interests; it is just a
tool used to reach an agreement. The EC is the clash between the U.S. and State A’s
competing interests.
CIL generally reflects the interests of the great powers, the states most likely to
develop and enforce international law. In a world without an independent, central
enforcement mechanism, powerful states are the only actors with the capacity to enforce
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CIL. If CIL generally reflects great power interests,135 and great powers can enforce CIL
on weaker states, we should not be surprised that “almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time.”136
Nor should we be surprised to hear that great powers attempt to redefine, circumvent, or
even ignore international law as their interests demand. Since CIL is generally not a
constraint on great powers, it is not a good measure of ECs in international politics.
Similarly, shared norms are difficult to define and instrumentalize to show a
causal effect in constraining state behavior. Of course, it is true that shared norms change
over time and that such norms shape the background in which individuals and states
act.137 For example, the emergence of international human rights norms,138 the rise of
international organizations and courts,139 and the prominence of democratic
governance140 are surely reflective of both shared norms among states and the interests of
the states capable of effecting the change. But it is difficult to predict the content of
newly shared norms, the likelihood of their emergence, and their causal effect on state
behavior. International human rights norms, courts, and organizations have been tools
used by the U.S. and the EU to pursue their interests, but it is unclear if the norms are
antecedent to or epiphenomenal of great power interests. These problems make shared
norms difficult to evaluate and even less helpful as a metric to measure the level of ECs
on great powers.
5.

NGOs and World Public Opinion

Finally, NGOs and world public opinion generally have limited causal effect.
NGOs provide information about the practices of states on myriad issues, ranging from
human rights violations to levels of environmental protection.141 Much of this
information exposes states and allows NGOs to “name and shame”142 violators. While
135
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their work brings attention to shameful practices, it is not clear that the NGOs by
themselves can regularly effectuate significant change without the support of and
pressure from sympathetic states. Though there are certainly successful cases in which
states have curbed certain activities due, in part, to NGO pressure, it is hard to
disaggregate the effect of the NGO from all the other causal factors that might lead states
to stop certain practices, including economic and political pressure from other states and
international organizations. Their efforts are laudable, but relative to material power the
capacity of NGOs to constrain powerful states is likely limited.
Similarly, world public opinion is reflected in the interests of individual states,
making a focus on states generally sufficient to capture its causal effect, if any. World
public opinion is a proxy for the views of the powerful states that oppose a policy of
another powerful state. Few, if anyone, suggest that public opinion in India and China
should or does have any effect on U.S. behavior independent of the sovereign interests of
those states. Though there are exceptions, state interests often rest on some element of
public opinion within the state and are manifested in the policy preferences of that state.
World public opinion is rarely a meaningful, independent EC on states.
Finally, non-state actors do play a role in constraining states. The activities of
terrorist groups, for example, have caused states to modify foreign affairs priorities and
increased the costs of achieving policy goals. But even the costs that they can impose are
far outweighed by those generated by great powers like the old Soviet Union and twentyfirst century China. Moreover, terrorist groups are often easily associated with states,
namely the states that support, harbor, or protect them. Again, the focus is on states, just
as polarity suggests. Of course, non-state actors are not something easily captured by
broader, structural approaches, and there will be constraints that a focus on polarity will
miss. In the end, this discussion suggests that while polarity is an imperfect tool to
measure the ECs that exist in international politics, it is likely the most effective, easiest
to apply, and most intuitive of the alternatives. The alternatives focus on an aspect of
international politics that might, under certain conditions, provide a modicum of
constraint on a state. But each is conceptually unclear and produces significant
measurement problems. Moreover, the ECs that the alternative metrics represent are
likely captured, in significant part, by examining the interests of the great powers.
Polarity is not a panacea but it produces a rough approximation of the ECs in
international politics. In the end, polarity must be measured against the virtues of the
existing alternatives, not against the non-existent, perfect measure.
V.

A FRAMEWORK OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

It is clear that the President engages in foreign affairs under some level of ICs and
ECs. Congress provides the internal constraints and the existence of other powerful states
in the world provides the external constraints. The combination of ICs and ECs represents
the total level of constraint on the President. Once the President has navigated the ICs at

37

the domestic level, he must also work through the ECs at the international level to
achieve U.S. interests. Depending on the arrangement of ICs and ECs, the President
might face varying level of constraints in foreign affairs. This suggests that consideration
of ECs and the total level of constraint on the President might be useful for trying to
optimize the level of ICs.
A.

Competing Models of Internal Constraint

Let’s imagine that Congress is trying to decide how to calibrate the level of
constraint on its agent, the President, and it is doing so without considering the ECs.
Congress might come up with different models of constraint, ranging from the maximum
constraint model to a minimal constraint model with other mixed models in between. For
simplicity’s sake, let’s focus on the two models of constraint on either end of the
spectrum, with the first fully constraining the President and the second providing little
constraint.
1.

Minimum Constraint Model

Model One, a minimum constraint model, would leave the President nearly
unfettered discretion in foreign affairs. Congress would delegate broad authority to the
President to formulate and pursue U.S. interests with little oversight. Congress would
appropriate monies upon the President’s request and with the political branches operating
in tandem, the judiciary would have little reason to meddle in foreign affairs. And if the
courts were involved, they would interpret the Constitution’s explicit grants, implicit
grants, or residual “catch-all” clauses to provide the President with broad foreign affairs
authority. We can call this minimum constraint model a maximum discretion model for
the President.
Model One focuses on the institutional expertise of the executive and the relative
inability of the courts and Congress to improve foreign affairs outcomes. Some might feel
that this arrangement is ideal for Congress if it wants its agent to be successful. If the
President is the most competent actor in foreign affairs—a key assumption of this
model—it is not clear that foreign affairs outcomes will improve as a result of greater
oversight. Congress should delegate and get out of the way.
2.

Maximum Constraint Model

Model Two is the maximum constraint model. Congress would only narrowly
delegate authority to the President and would subject him to strict oversight. Congress
would aggressively exercise its appropriation power and advice and consent prerogatives,
and jealously guard its war making authority. The President would still execute foreign
policy but he would be a highly constrained agent of Congress.

38

Model Two emphasizes congressional constraint on the President. But what are
the consequences of this model? We might think that whatever the President’s strengths
are today, the Constitution envisions a strong role for Congress and the courts to maintain
a system of checks and balances. One might argue that power has shifted to the President,
weakening the checks and balances and creating a dangerous concentration of power. If
Congress exercises only weak constraint over the President, it might lead to foreign
affairs errors.143 Congress should actively review its agent’s foreign affairs activities.
One could generate doctrinal arguments supporting each model of judicial
behavior from the Constitution, legal precedent, historical practice, and the views of the
Founders, among other legal materials. The debate about the constitutionally valid model
would look inward, namely to domestic variables. The debate would be resolved on those
terms.
While this is a stylized description, both of the models suffer from a conventional
baseline problem, namely the level of current practice against which the models apply. If
we do not know the baseline, it is difficult to determine where the U.S.’s current practice
is along the spectrum between the two models, or how far we need to move along the
spectrum toward either of the them. The baseline problem also shapes the debate about
the appropriate level of constraint, leaving proponents of each model to look to doctrine,
precedent, practice, and expertise to justify their positions rather than specifically
determining the conditions under which either model might apply.
B.

Model One or Model Two?

Understanding the relationship between ICs and ECs will help determine the
conditions under which stronger or weaker constraints might be appropriate. The
pertinent question becomes the following: “under what conditions should Congress
employ strong or weak ICs over the President?”
To simplify, let’s focus on the strong constraints of the multipolar world and the
weak constraints of the unipolar world. Congress has to decide which Model to follow in
light of the external environment.
As a risk-averse principal, Congress wants to ensure that the President acts as a
loyal agent but still has sufficient discretion to use his specialized knowledge. Consider
the relationship between Congress and the President in a unipolar world where the U.S. is
the superpower. What is unique about this environment? First, as the agent, the President
has an expanded range of foreign policy options to pursue because the constraints from
143
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the rest of the world are weak. Thus, given the lack of ECs, the agent has more
opportunities to deviate from the principal’s wishes. Congress is aware that the U.S. is
already dominant in foreign affairs and does not want its agent to engage in activities that
might jeopardize this advantage.
Second, the informational asymmetry between the agent and the principal in a
unipolar environment decreases. Generally, the agent has some information unavailable
to the principal, making monitoring important to gain the agent’s compliance. But in a
unipolar world, the U.S.’s dominance makes it easier for the Congress, as principal, to
extract information from other states about their interests. As a superpower, the U.S.’s
ability to monitor and influence the policies of states grows, increasing the amount of
information available to both Congress and the President. In such an environment, the
principal’s need to rely on the agent’s provision of information is less pronounced
Third and relatedly, the value of the agent’s specialized knowledge—in this case
diplomatic skill—decreases. When the U.S. is the superpower, the threat environment
changes; states are reluctant to challenge the U.S. The kind of diplomatic skill required to
achieve the U.S.’s foreign policy goals in a complex international environment are not as
uniquely important in a unipolar world. In such a world, the principal is unlikely to rely
as much on the agent’s special expertise.
This analysis suggests that in a unipolar world—a world with weak constraints on
the U.S.—Congress should employ Model Two with stronger constraints on the
President. The absence of ECs provides the agent with more opportunities to deviate from
the principal’s wishes and reduces the premium on the agent’s specialized skill, while
providing the principal with greater access to information about the agent’s activities.
The situation along each dimension changes in a multipolar world. In a multipolar
world, the ECs on the U.S. are strong and limit the range of action for the President. As
an agent, the President’s opportunities to deviate from the wishes of Congress decrease
and, interestingly, the costs of error increase. With many other powerful states in the
world, the President will be aware that the cost of deviating from Congress and
committing foreign policy blunders will generate significant problems for the U.S. This
suggests that the President will act more like a faithful agent in a multipolar than in a
unipolar world. In addition, the information asymmetries between the principal and agent
grow in a multipolar world. With states competing and concealing information, it is
harder for Congress to monitor the activities of its agent and other states, making it more
dependent on the agent’s provision of information. Finally, strong ECs make the
achievement of the principal’s goals harder, making the specialized skill of the agent
more valuable. Here, Congress will rely upon the agent’s skill in the achievement of its
foreign policy goals.
In a multipolar world, the Congress should employ Model One and place weak
constraints on the President. The strong ECs reduce the likelihood of the agent deviating
from the principal’s wishes because the agent’s range of options is smaller and his
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informational and expertise advantages are particularly important in a multipolar world.
In effect, the underlying conditions of the international environment—multipolar or
bipolar—affect the principal’s relationship with its agent. Since agency costs vary as
conditions change, Congress should vary the strength of the constraints it uses to limit the
President’s discretion to act.
A.
External Constraints and Agency Costs
1.

Substitutability

Based on this analysis, for some foreign affairs law questions the international
environment’s ECs on the U.S. serve as crude substitutes for the principal’s ICs on the
agent. If this is correct, then we must determine the specific areas of foreign affairs law in
which this logic applies. The substitutability of ECs is most likely for issues upon which
Congress is likely to delegate authority to the President, mainly security-related
questions. Such issues include congressional delegations that directly implicate the extent
of the President’s authority: the limitations on the President’s exercise of independent
military powers;144 the breadth of Article II’s textual grants;145 the executive’s unilateral
termination of defense-related treaties;146 the definition of hostilities;147 the interrogation
of enemy combatants;148 and the extent of U.S. participation in international
institutions.149 Congress might delegate authority to the President with tightly-drafted,
narrow statutory grants. And the courts, as the faithful agents of Congress, might interpret
the Constitution and the relevant precedent narrowly to limit the President.150 Thus, the
President as the agent of Congress would be operating under strong ICs with respect to
these powers.
However, in a multipolar world the strong ECs already partially deter the
President from deviating from the wishes of Congress in those areas, making strong ICs
unnecessary. Assume that Congress delegates some authority to the President to develop
U.S. foreign policy, but specifically limits the President from sending U.S. troops abroad
without the express authorization of Congress. But the President diverges from the
wishes of Congress and decides that he wants to send troops to Taiwan to encourage
Taiwanese independence; engage in pre-emptive hostilities against Iran and North Korea;
send troops to protect Georgia from another Russian invasion; or intervene in Sudan to
prevent genocide. Each initiative touches upon an area of foreign affairs law, namely the
144
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President’s independent or unilateral authority to commit the U.S. to potential hostilities.
Congress has already specifically denied its agent, the President, the authority to pursue
these initiatives unilaterally. But the President, no matter how much he wants to deviate
from the wishes of Congress and act, also realizes that the U.S. is in a multipolar world
that includes China, Russia, and the EU.
In such a world, each great power has its own set of interests and actively pursues
them. Going back to the example above, Russia might be an ally of the Iranian regime;
China might have allies in Sudan and North Korea; and the EU might prefer stability in
the Middle East rather than regime change. Given these interests, the President would
have to internalize myriad political and military costs of getting involved in Taiwan, Iran,
North Korea, and Sudan. The President would realize that these initiatives would
interfere directly with the interests of the other great powers and might result in a Russian
or Chinese response that could impose serious costs on the U.S. Knowing this, the
President is likely to be circumspect about pursuing those goals and, most important,
reluctant to deviate from the wishes of Congress. The President would be constrained by
the strong ECs of the multipolar world and, if they deter the President from deviating
from the wishes of Congress, then the strong ICs are redundant.
2.

Costs and Benefits of Redundancy

Despite the apparent redundancy, Congress might find strong ICs on the President
in a multipolar world to be unproblematic or even preferable. Why? First, whatever the
strength of ECs, Congress might conclude that they are not perfect substitutes for ICs
because ICs have a value separate from constraint on the President. They concretize a
conception of the normatively preferable governance form, namely tripartite government
with meaningful checks and balances. They encourage debate across branches and the
generation of information for the public, leading to more informed decisions. ECs may
deter the President in some limited contexts but they do not instantiate the value of
separation of powers and transparency in foreign affairs.
Second, the complexity of a multipolar world militates against weak ICs on the
President. Since a multipolar world is especially complicated and the executive is not
perfect, the consequences of agency costs might be particularly high. Even with a strict
congressional delegation to the President, a poorly conceived or executed foreign policy
by the President might create enormous foreign affairs problems, and this fear justifies
additional monitoring of the agent.
This is a tempting but incorrect line of thinking. The claim in this Article is not
that ECs perfectly replicate the effect of ICs across all areas of foreign affairs law.
Rather, the claim is that there may be some set of questions—especially in the security
context—for which strong ECs will serve the same deterrence function as strong ICs.
True, the claim focuses on the principal’s constraint of its agent with respect to foreign
affairs outcomes rather than the process values that ICs might represent. The scope of the
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claim is limited: the strength of ICs should vary depending on the level of ECs. In a
world with strong ECs, weak ICs might be preferable.
Second, in a multipolar world, the cost of redundancy outweighs the benefits. If
the President is more competent in foreign affairs than Congress, it is unlikely that strong
ECs and ICs will ensure the President’s fidelity to Congress and permit the President to
use his specialized knowledge to achieve Congress’s goals. In light of this, it is preferable
for Congress to free the President to navigate the complicated multipolar world and
pursue congressional prerogatives, not to overconstrain him with strong ICs. Since the
strong ECs already constrain the U.S. and mimic the effect of the ICs, it is unclear what
the principal gains from imposing strong ICs on its agent as well. Strong ECs combined
with strong congressional ICs would overconstrain the President.
Still, one might argue that there are no real costs from duplicating strong ECs
with strong ICs. If the President is already deterred by ECs, what is the harm of having
strong ICs? Building from the previous example, consider the following. The President
operates under strong ICs and ECs. Internally, Congress subjects his foreign affairs
decision-making to significant legislative oversight and the judiciary interprets the
President’s independent military powers narrowly, consistent with Congress’s
preferences. Externally, the President is constrained by the other great powers. Suddenly,
the President develops intelligence that the government in Sudan wants to strengthen its
relationship with the U.S. and move away from China. But Sudan also specifically
requests that the President immediately send troops to prevent any possible Chinese
response. The President determines that this course of action would be beneficial for the
U.S. and wants to send 10,000 soldiers to Sudan. However, the President realizes that
Congress and the courts are likely to want to review the intelligence upon which the
President based his decision, debate whether the passage of an authorization for use of
military force is necessary, determine the potential costs of the engagement, and so on.
The President, concerned that the U.S. will lose the opportunity if it dithers, wants to act
unilaterally but cannot because the constraints imposed by Congress are strong. Of
course, this is a simplified example but it illustrates the ways in which strong ICs in a
world with strong ECs might overconstrain the President. The issue is discussed at
greater length below.
3.

Over and Under Constraint

This logic also applies to the some of the examples discussed earlier. Strong ICs
in a multipolar world are too broad and overconstrain the President: they would not only
deter the President from deviating from Congress’s wishes in the U.S./Taiwan/China
example (good), but also limit the gains from the President’s specialized knowledge and
expertise in the U.S./Sudan/China example (bad).
One might argue that the examples posed above are unrealistic or that Congress
would not prevent the President from acting. But the critique misses the point. Sure, it is
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difficult to know in advance how the President and Congress would respond to
exogenous shocks from international politics. But we can certainly think about how
international politics might affect institutional design in foreign affairs, and how that
design might encourage or discourage certain types of behavior. The insight here is that
ECs and some ICs are substitutable; that strong ECs and strong ICs can be redundant at
times; and that this redundancy reduces the agent’s discretion in ways that might limit his
ability to achieve the principal’s goals.
By viewing both ECs and ICs, we have a better understanding of the total level of
constraint on the President. And if we are concerned that there are conditions under
which higher or lower levels of constraint might result in costs for Congress, ECs must be
included in any analysis. When the U.S. is operating under the strong ECs of a multipolar
world, Congress should not impose strong ICs on the President. Under this condition or
state of the world, weak ICs are preferred.
The unipolar world presents a different challenge. Let’s assume that the U.S. has
gained in relative power vis-à-vis Country A, and has become the hegemon or
superpower of a unipolar system. The U.S. may have adopted better economic polices,
increased worker productivity, committed more monies to the military, or developed new
technologies to increase its material power, or alternatively Country A may have made
domestic policy errors that led to its decline. Whatever the reason, as a hegemon the U.S.
has a tremendous capacity to pursue its national interests because the potential for friction
with competing great powers decreases; in some respects the U.S. stands alone in
international politics. While hegemonic status certainly does not mean that the U.S. can
do anything it wants, it does suggest that the U.S. has the opportunity to define its
interests more broadly, pursue policies that were previously implausible, and act more
assertively. Since the ECs are weak in a unipolar world, the U.S. could attempt to achieve
goals that would have been much more difficult in a multipolar world.
Under unipolarity, the weakness of ECs on the U.S. changes the calculus
regarding the appropriate level of constraint that Congress should exercise over the
President. Recall that in a multipolar world, the ECs are substitutes for some types of ICs
and deter the President. Strong ICs would be redundant. But in a unipolar world, the
substitutability point falls away. Weak ECs will not substitute for the weak ICs and deter
the President. If both the ECs and ICs are weak, the President will have great discretion
in foreign affairs because, along both the internal and external dimensions, he is not
constrained by Congress or by the international environment.
This is exactly the condition under which we might expect the agent to deviate
from the wishes of the principal. It is not certain that there will be agency costs; the claim
is that we can isolate some of the conditions under which the probability of such costs
increases and can make the necessary adjustment of ICs. Thus, in a unipolar world, the
ICs should be strong. If not, the President would be underconstrained, creating the
conditions for deviation from the principal’s wishes or pursuit of its own interests.
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One might counter that strong ICs in a unipolar world create costs, namely those
associated with delaying or preventing the President from using his expertise to achieve
Congress’s goals. If these costs were problematic in a multipolar world, why would not
they create similar issues in a unipolar world as well? In a unipolar world, the U.S. is the
hegemon—it has no peer great power competitor and is free from strong ECs. Since the
U.S. has this freedom of action, the President has the capacity to achieve the U.S.’s
policy goals, even when tightly constrained by Congress. The strong IC has the benefit of
ensuring that the agent is loyal, while not stopping the agent from using his expertise to
realize the principal’s goals. Since the U.S. is a hegemon, Congress gets the benefits of a
loyal agent but avoids the costs of missed opportunities. When the President is weakly
constrained by ECs, courts should provide stronger ICs.
4.

Agency Costs in a Unipolar World

The framework suggests that the President is more prone to deviate from
Congress’s interests under unipolarity than multi-polarity. On first blush, this might seem
curious: some would immediately note that the executive’s institutional structure and the
President’s domestic political incentives remain the same regardless of changes in
international politics. But as I will more speculatively suggest below, the U.S.’s
hegemonic power in a unipolar system will likely shift the political discourse, making
previously untenable, potentially extreme foreign policy preferences more plausible.
These preferences tend to be linked to the more nationalistic, American exceptionalist
end of the political spectrum. For several reasons, these policy preferences often result in
preventative war, occupation, and nation building, among other things. Each of these
activities creates a higher probability of error and reflects the ways in which the
President, as an agent, might deviate from Congress’s wishes.
The exact source of a state’s foreign policy preferences is difficult to specify,
making predictions about state behavior difficult. Realists look to the structure of the
international system, arguing that the lack of a central enforcement mechanism or a
global policeman requires states to privilege survival of the regime.151 Thus, states are
primarily concerned with the development of material power. Liberal theorists look to
domestic sources to explain foreign policy preferences, namely elite interests and regime
type.152 Foreign policy outcomes are a result of those factors, not the structure of the
international system. Social constructivists look to norms and demonstrate that norms can
evolve and change—decisions by the individuals that comprise states are made in a
specific normative environment.153 Change the environment, and state preferences might
change as well.
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The problem with these approaches is that they purport to provide a general
theory to explain foreign policy preferences rather than asking, “Under what conditions
are these sources more or less influential in the development of a state’s foreign policy
preferences?” By framing the question this way, we can look at how changes in the
strength of ECs might affect preference formation. Let’s begin with the U.S. in a
multipolar world.
In these worlds, the ECs on the U.S. are stronger than those in a unipolar world.
The U.S. is competing with other great powers to achieve its policy preferences. But what
are those preferences? If we look to domestic sources like elite preferences, regime type,
and norms, we might view the U.S. as a country that believes in its own
exceptionalism;154 wants to spread democracy and American values; encourages free
trade and respect for human rights; and wants to ensure its position as the most powerful
country in the world.155 For the sake of classification, I will describe these as normative
or aspirational goals. Realists, on the other hand, argue that the international system
forces states to seek the same overarching goals, namely ensuring survival through the
accumulation of power. For example, the U.S. would likely privilege strategic interests
relating to military strength and economic growth over normative concerns like the
promotion of democracy; the U.S.’s support of friendly, right-wing dictatorships during
the Cold War is often cited as evidence of realist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy.156 I
will characterize these as strategic or expedient goals.
Of course, these preferences do not neatly fit into a dichotomy between those with
domestic sources and those derived from the international system. Military strength and
economic growth—the components of material power—are likely to be consistent with
both domestic sources and those from the international system. Although the lines
between strategic and normative are often blurred, we can distinguish between a policy
that supports human rights-violating monarchies in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and one that
only supports democracies. We can distinguish a policy that conditions free trade with
China on improving human rights with one that de-links the two.157 With this in mind, the
key is to try to understand the conditions under which the U.S. is more likely to privilege
the strategic over the normative and vice-versa.
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Multipolar worlds have stronger ECs, thereby limiting the U.S.’s capacity to
pursue and achieve all of its foreign policy goals. The U.S. might have a set of first-order
preferences but the presence of competing great powers will make realizing those
preferences difficult. Given these strong constraints, the U.S. would likely focus on the
foreign policy preferences essential to preserving its position, and relegate aspirational
goals to secondary concerns.
For example, the U.S. might ideally want to support democracy and human rights
everywhere but will settle, as it did during the Cold War, for aiding pro-US right-wing
regimes in the face of competition with the former Soviet Union.158 The U.S. might
ideally want to support the UN and the UNSC for the resolution of issues related to
international peace and security but will circumvent the UN and engage in proxy wars
with other great powers to prevent potential threats. In other words, when the ECs are
strong, the U.S. will be sensitive to the consequences of a decline in material power and
focus on maintaining its relative power vis-à-vis the other great powers. Under these
conditions, normative aspirations like spreading democracy and enforcing international
human rights law are still important, but remain secondary goals.
However, the U.S.’s calculus changes in a unipolar world. Recall that in a
unipolar world the U.S. is the hegemon and its material power far surpasses the other
dominant states. The potential for friction with other great powers and the costs that they
can impose decrease, putting the U.S. in a position to realize foreign policy preferences
that were previously too difficult to achieve. How would this change the balance between
the strategic and the normative goals?
The U.S. would be more secure in its capacity to ensure its strategic preferences
are met. The potential for conflict with other states is lower and the need to make the
difficult compromises and accommodations of the multipolar world—for example, the
support of distasteful but pro-US dictatorships—recedes. Thus the U.S. can start to focus
on its normative goals and pursue them more aggressively than it could multipolar
worlds. The foreign policy preferences that grow from domestic sources begin to
supersede traditional realist concerns.
It is under this condition that the President, as the agent of Congress, is more
likely to deviate from his principal’s interests. Historically, when the U.S. is a unipolar
world power or dominant in its region, foreign policy goals tend to reflect American
nationalism and exceptionalism: a desire to spread American values, often by force, and a
self-congratulatory triumphalism that manifests itself in unilateralism. Of course, these
factors are generally present in U.S. foreign policy, whether or not the U.S. is in a
unipolar or multipolar world. While this may be true, it misses the salient point—in
multipolar worlds, the ECs on the U.S. mitigate the effects of U.S. nationalism on U.S.
foreign policy and force the U.S. to be more sensitive to strategic concerns. However, in
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the absence of ECs in a unipolar world, nationalistic tendencies grow more prominent in
the development of U.S. foreign policy.
There is anecdotal evidence consistent with this hypothesis. For example, in the
late nineteenth century, the U.S. became the regional hegemon in North America, the
regional unipolar power. It was subject to weak ECs and Congress did not, at least
initially, constrain the President. The U.S. fought a war with Spain and assumed control
over its former territories, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and the
Philippines.159 With Spain no longer serving as an EC on the U.S., the U.S. started to
exercise its military dominance in the region. The rise in U.S. power contributed to a
change in the political discourse: foreign policy goals began to reflect American
nationalistic tendencies. “Manifest Destiny,”160 “White Man’s Burden,”161 and other
jingoistic ideologies developed around that time to justify U.S. occupation and
governance over the people in newly conquered territories. Claims for military expansion
in Latin America and the Philippines that would not have been plausible or dominant in
the political discourse while Spain was still a serious presence in the region became more
common as the U.S. became the new power in the region. Most important, the benefits of
the expansionary policies were questionable; the U.S.’s occupation of the Philippines and
meddling in Latin America created material costs in military expenditures, opportunity
costs, and casualties162 and has been noted as one of the factors that might have
contributed to the instability of Latin American governments throughout the twentieth
century.163 Perhaps stronger ICs might have mitigated some of these problems.
US foreign policy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has
repeated the same pattern. During this period, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the
U.S. became the hegemon of a unipolar world. Like the previous period when the U.S.
was the regional hegemon, the U.S.’s nationalistic tendencies assumed a more prominent
role in foreign policy. American politicians and scholars characterized the U.S. as the
“Indispensable Nation”164 charged with the self-imposed responsibility to spread
democracy and protect human rights around the world. In the early 1990s, the U.S. sent
troops to Panama to remove Manuel Noriega and restore democracy and to Somalia in an
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ill-fated humanitarian mission. A few years later, the U.S. sent troops to support the
democratically elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti and later facilitated
the departure of the same Aristide after his government was ineffective.
In the late 1990s, the U.S. ignored the UNSC to bomb Serbia to protect Kosovar
Albanians.165 After the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. later occupied Afghanistan to capture
Osama Bin Laden166 and destroy the Taliban, and is currently engaged in an apparently
unsuccessful nation-building project. In 2003, the U.S. again ignored the UNSC to invade
Iraq during the Second Gulf War, creating another coalition of the willing to support the
mission.167 The U.S. attempted to remake the Middle East in its image, overthrowing
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and installing a new government with the belief that it
would lead to the collapse of dictatorships across the region.168 As others have noted:
“The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but
peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait
in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq
between 2003 and 2010. In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen
of the twenty-two years since the end
of the Cold War. Put another way,
the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of
U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at
war.”169 (internal citations omitted).
Though the evidence is anecdotal and merits deeper study, it suggests that the
structure of the international system contributes to shaping the domestic sources of U.S.
foreign policy. When the ECs are strong, we are likely to see the U.S. focus on strategic
interests and deemphasize aspirational concerns, consistent with the view that the
structure of the international system shapes state outcomes. However, as a unipolar
power, the U.S. is free from some of the security concerns most prominent in multipolar
and bipolar worlds and can focus on the aspirational aspects of foreign policy derived
from domestic sources: spreading democracy, promoting American values, and pursuing
nation-building projects. Such policy goals tend to promote overexpansion, the type of
errors that unconstrained Presidents are likely to commit.
VI.
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To understand how the framework would work in practice, let’s loosen the
assumption that courts are faithful agents of Congress and consider whether courts are
well-placed to make determinations about polarity. Though determining polarity is not
traditionally a judicial task, it is not demonstrably different from what courts do regularly
in foreign affairs cases. Whether explicitly or implicitly, courts consider the
consequences of their decisions on U.S. foreign policy and the potential dangers of
interfering with the political branches’ foreign affairs prerogatives. Consider the political
question doctrine,170 act-of-state doctrine,171 and international comity doctrine.172 Each is
a prudential doctrine that permits a court to conclude that it does not have the expertise to
adjudicate certain issues properly before it or that the consequence of adjudication might
be detrimental to the political branches’ ability to conduct foreign policy. For example,
when applying the political question doctrine in foreign affairs, a court has to determine
whether or not it is competent to adjudicate the foreign affairs question before
determining if the doctrine should be applied. In other words, a court must make a selfreflective judgment about whether the issue is within its ambit of expertise or whether the
political branches should resolve it, even though courts are purportedly ill-equipped to
make that determination.
Second, courts discuss international politics, war, and hostilities when evaluating
the international relations consequences of their decisions. In Sabbatino, an act-of-state
doctrine case, the Supreme Court refers to the tensions with Cuba, differences in the
understanding of expropriation under international law between Communist and free
market countries, and the potential consequences of a decision on the merits.173 In Pink
and Belmont,174 the Supreme Court notes the revolution in the former Soviet Union and
the need for the executive to make determinations regarding the settlement of claims. In
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Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)175 cases, the courts routinely consider submissions by the
executive branch regarding the consequences of adjudication on U.S. foreign policy as
they balance the interests of the President with those of the litigant-victims of human
rights abuses. In each example, courts consider the effects of their decisions on the
President in his pursuit of U.S. interests.
Third, determining polarity does not require courts to make specific foreign
affairs decisions for which they lack expertise; it just provides a background variable that
informs their understanding of the appropriate level of constraint on the President. In this
way, courts are simply asked to engage in a threshold determination regarding the
strength of ECs before adjudicating the underlying foreign affairs question. Moreover,
since the strength of ECs change gradually, courts would not be burdened with
determining polarity on an ongoing basis. They would simply engage in the same
evaluation of international politics common in foreign affairs cases.
A.

Incentives of Congress and the Courts

Given the political incentives and structural weaknesses of both Congress and the
courts, it might seem odd to recommend stronger ICs in multipolar worlds. After all, why
would Congress or the courts the want to assume an oversight responsibility with no
strategic benefits? Interestingly, we do have evidence that Congress grants broader
statutory authorization to the President and courts modulate the level of constraint on the
President in response to internal and external shocks. During emergencies and crises,
courts tend to defer to the President.176 They move from some unknown, ex ante baseline
level of constraint on the President to an ex post, weaker level of constraint in response.
This suggests that Congress, or at least the courts, vary the level of constraint on the
President under certain conditions.
Further, we know that Congress and the courts do not maintain the weaker
constraints on the President indefinitely. Once the crisis or emergency has passed,
Congress and the courts return to some ex ante baseline level of constraint. Of course, it
is extremely difficult to locate the baseline; the point here is that Congress has calibrated
the level of constraint in response to the U.S.’s foreign affairs needs. For the courts, this
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Alien Tort Claims Act (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay National
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 16 (“[C]ourts defer heavily to government in times of
emergency, either by upholding government’s action on the merits, or by ducking hard cases that might
require ruling against the government.”).
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pattern is also apparent in the tax context,177 protection of civil liberties,178 and in some of
the case law.179
Given the willingness of Congress and the courts to adjust the constraint level on
the President in response to crises, it is plausible to imagine that Congress could make the
same adjustment in response to ECs. In fact, there are reasons to suspect that Congress
and the courts might be more willing to do so in this context. When Congress and the
courts determine the level of constraint on the President, they gravitate between strong
and weak constraint models based on an ad hoc set of factors including past precedent,
historical practice, and institutional competencies. Neither level of constraint—strong or
weak—is particularly justifiable without a metric of analysis. Each model has strengths
and weaknesses but Congress and the courts lack a metric to determine which is best
under certain conditions.
In contrast, the framework outlined here provides Congress and the courts with a
normative justification for preferring one model to the other and explains the conditions
under which each applies. It is an independent basis for oversight that ensures the
principal’s control over its agent but avoids encumbering the agent with constraints that
limit his ability to exploit specialized knowledge. In effect, the framework explains when
the weak and strong IC constraint models are most useful and, by extension, provides
Congress and the courts with guidance on the appropriate conditions for more significant
oversight.
B.

Implications for Deference in Foreign Affairs

My framework suggests that Congress and the courts should strengthen ICs as
ECs weaken. How? The main tool available to courts is the use of procedural constraints,
namely increasing the costs of presidential action by lowering the level of deference to
executive determinations,180 imposing clear statement requirements,181 and encouraging
political branch cooperation, among other things, which will slow the President’s ability
to act unilaterally and, in some cases, might deter the President from pursuing a particular
course of action. Consider deference regimes with respect to executive treaty
interpretations. Traditionally, courts have given “great weight”182 deference to the
President’s construction of ambiguous treaty terms. Courts have given “respectful
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Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein, & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A
Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1219 (concluding that judicial decisions are more deferential
to the government during times of crisis).
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See Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King, & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis:
How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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See Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283; Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144.
180
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 20.
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consideration”183 to the President’s statements about the consequences of international
human rights litigation under the ATS on U.S. foreign policy. These deference regimes
are fixed in the sense that they do not vary as U.S. power waxes and wanes or as ECs
strengthen or weaken. They are rooted in assumptions about separation of powers, the
appropriate roles for each branch of government, and executive prerogatives in foreign
affairs: the internal factors only.
But these deference regimes should also be responsive to structural changes in
international politics. We can imagine a dynamic model that captures the separation of
powers concerns embodied in the Constitution while still moving closer to an optimal
level of constraint on the President. For example, courts can vary the level of deference
depending on the strength of ECs. Higher levels of deference would be appropriate in a
multipolar world, while lower levels of deference might be preferred in a unipolar world.
Using the examples above, in a multipolar world “intermediate deference” would become
great weight deference and respectful consideration becomes intermediate deference.
Since the ECs are high, the ICs should weaken.
Similarly, in a unipolar world, great weight deference becomes intermediate
deference; intermediate deference becomes respectful consideration; and respectful
consideration results in no deference at all. In this example, the ECs are low and the ICs
should strengthen. Neither deviating from its adjudicatory function nor assuming a
disproportionate role in foreign affairs, the court could calibrate the level of constraint on
the President in light of ECs and stay faithful to the structure of existing deference
regimes. It can increase costs on the President’s exercise of foreign affairs authority.
The same logic applies to clear statement rules and democracy-enhancing
adjudication. The courts can narrowly construe congressional authorizations by requiring
clear statements from Congress regarding the President’s exercise of authority in a
particular area. By doing so, the President is forced to be more explicit in requesting and
justifying foreign affairs authority, and Congress is incentivized to consider the costs and
benefits of broad or narrow authorizations and specify them accordingly. Courts can also
narrowly construe the President’s independent foreign affairs authority. For example,
courts might hear challenges to the President’s capacity to independently commit U.S.
troops to hostilities under NATO auspices and conclude that while the President cannot
do so independently, he can with congressional authorization. In this way, the President is
forced to consult Congress and coordinate before acting.
Some might reject the analysis as too simplistic. For them, deference regimes are
effectively meaningless: intermediate deference is an empty concept that allows judges to
make determinations based on their own preferences, much like foreseeability,
unconscionability or reasonableness standards in other areas of the law. Clear statement
rules might appear beneficial in theory but actually increase the cost of legislation—
measured by both time and complexity—as the President and Congress have to specify
183
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every possible exercise of authority. Moreover, clarity is a subjective concept, making
clear statement rules susceptible to the same conceptual criticisms applied to deference
regimes.
Although each of these critiques has merit, they would not only apply to existing
foreign affairs jurisprudence but also to most areas of the law. In that sense, the critiques
prove too much; if every standard is susceptible to manipulation and every rule is subject
to circumvention, then normative theories that rely upon existing jurisprudence are
unhelpful. However problematic deference regimes might be, they are common in foreign
affairs law and shape contemporary debates about the appropriate role of the President,
Congress, and the courts. My framework takes this structure as given and tries to
integrate a normative calculus that can be applied relatively easily without disturbing the
existing foreign affairs jurisprudence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The central claim is that determining the appropriate level of deference to the
President requires consideration of both internal, domestic constraints and external,
international constraints. The framework is a tool for Congress to try and ensure that the
President is a faithful agent, while at the same time providing the President with the
necessary latitude to achieve Congress’s goals.
The framework is also helpful in thinking about other areas of foreign affairs and
constitutional law. Consider U.S. delegations of decision-making authority to
international institutions. Should Congress be more circumspect about such delegations
in a multipolar world, when the U.S. might not be able to influence the decisions of
international institutions? Or should Congress be happy to delegate when the U.S. is the
unipolar power with the capacity to shape institutional outcomes? The role of external
constraints might be particularly important in answering this question. Similarly, are
courts more likely to invoke federalism limitations in foreign affairs when the U.S. is a
unipolar and the external constraints are weak, and less likely to do so when the external
constraints are strong? International delegations and federalism are only two areas in
which an evaluation of the external political environment may have consequences for
domestic law. At bottom, considering external constraints will likely influence the level
of internal constraints on a number of foreign affairs law issues; this Article takes the first
step toward understanding this relationship.
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